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                    20 February 2007

Behind the bombing of the train of love

Praveen Swami

Pakistan's jihadi press holds out clues to what the motives of the terrorists who attacked the Samjhauta Express might have been.

"MOHABBAT DI gaddi," Allah Ditta, a locomotive driver on the Samjhauta Express called it in a February 2000 interview: "the train of love." Only when counter-terrorism investigators in India succeed in arresting the perpetrators of the Samjhauta Express bombing will a full account of their motives emerge. But Pakistan's jihadi press, little monitored in India, provides not a little insight into the hearts and minds of the terrorists who most likely carried out the attack.

Islamists have, in recent weeks, repeatedly argued that the peace process poses a threat to both Pakistan's economic survival and its ideological raison d'etre. Growing interaction at the level of ordinary people, Islamists have claimed, is working to soften the hatred they believe is necessary to protect their nation. In their imagination, Allah Ditta's train of love is a Trojan Horse, a vehicle for the destruction of the project of Pakistan.

On January 15, the Lashkar's parent body, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, had organised a National Consultative Conference to formulate an Islamist response to the peace process. Attended among others by the President of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, Raja Zulqarnain Khan, the Conference "completely rejected President Pervez Musharraf's current suggestions regarding the resolution of the Kashmir issue."

"Indo-Pak negotiations on the Kashmir have never borne any fruit," the January 31 issue of the Lashkar house journal Ghazwa explained. "Up until now," it stated, "only India has enjoyed the benefits of the Islamabad Declaration. All Pakistan got from that agreement is an exchange of cultural troupes. And as if that wasn't enough, Indian politicians have taken the exchange of such cultural troupes a step forward by suggesting eradication of borders between India and Pakistan."

"On the other hand," Ghazwa went on, "our own rulers are trying to weaken our ideological borders, instead of strengthening them. Efforts are under way by the Pakistani government to remove facts and material from the curriculum which educates our youth about the designs of the Hindus, and exposes their real mindset about Muslims in general and Pakistan in particular."

Islamists have long claimed that the India-Pakistan people-to-people détente, of which the Samjhauta Express is a key medium, is a plot to undermine these "ideological borders." In April 2004, for example, the Lashkar-linked magazine Zarb-e-Taiba had called on its readers to "throw the bat, seize the sword." According to Zarb-e-Taiba, the "sports of a mujahid are archery, horse-riding and swimming. Apart from these three sports, every other hobby is un-Islamic. The above are not just sports but exercises for jihad. Cricket is an evil and sinful sport." "It is so sad," the magazine concluded, "that Pakistanis are committing suicides after losing cricket matches to India. But they are not sacrificing their lives to protect the honour of the raped Kashmiri women. To watch a cricket match, we would take a day off from work. But for jihad, we have no time!"

Ghazwa approvingly quoted a participant in the Conference, retired Pakistan Army General Faiz Ali Chishti, as asserting that "jihad remains the only solution of this conflict." However, General Chishti noted, pursuit of this strategy had been undermined by changing attitudes to India within Pakistan. According to Ghazwa, "he vociferously lamented, we have neglected to educate our younger generations about the Hindu mindset. He said Hindus have never accepted Pakistan's independence and are continually scheming to destroy it, one way or another."

Magazines like Ghazwa and Zarb-e-Taiba are required reading for Lashkar cadre — a fact that makes it possible that the perpetrators of the bombing intended to "educate" audiences in Pakistan. Another possibility is that the Samjhauta Express bombers hoped to retaliate against the construction of dams in Jammu and Kashmir — an action the jihadi press has marketed as an existential threat to Pakistan. Last week, a World Bank-appointed arbitrator ruled on the construction of the Baghliar Dam. In a February 15 press release, Lashkar political chief Abdul Rahman Makki claimed "India cannot build any dams at all on the Chenab River according to the stipulations of the Sindh-Taas Agreement." Mr. Makki claimed that the Baghliar Dam was being built because Pakistan's "timid rulers are so terrified of India."

"Pakistan's vast agricultural lands," Ghazwa had explained to its readers last month, "are extremely dependent upon the large amount of river water which originates in Kashmir. India, on the other hand, is making all out efforts to construct dams and barrages on these rivers so that it can gain another edge over Pakistan by choking its essential water resources." "In such a scenario," Ghazwa argued, "to say that Kashmir is Pakistan's `jugular vein' is an understatement. If India succeeds in depriving Pakistan of these vital water resources, nothing can stop Pakistan's agricultural lands from turning into a desert."

Such ideas have long constituted part of the strategic consensus in Pakistan — and were a major reason for its 1947 attack on Jammu and Kashmir. In his memoirs, Major-General Akbar Khan, the commander-in-chief of Pakistan's assault forces, observed that Pakistan's "agricultural economy was dependent particularly upon the rivers coming out of Kashmir." "The Mangla Headworks," General Khan wrote, "were actually in Kashmir and the Marala Headworks were within a mile or so of the border. What then would be our position if Kashmir was in Indian hands?" Lashkar leaders have long argued that only jihad can prevent this apocalyptic outcome. In an April 2003 interview to The Friday Times, Lashkar's spiritual head Hafiz Mohammad Saeed asserted that Pakistan ought not to "bow before India and beg for dialogue."

Taking on the General

Significantly, though, groups like the Lashkar have turned their fire to General Musharraf — and not just because of his policies on Jammu and Kashmir. In the January 2006 issue of the Lashkar magazine Voice of Islam, Mr. Makki charged General Musharraf with "inviting God's wrath" by repealing Pakistan's controversial Hudoodullah laws, which prescribed among other things that rape victims' allegations must be supported by the testimony of male witnesses. He added that the Pakistan Government was spreading "evil, obscenity and rebellion against Allah's way."

Similarly, Mr. Saeed last month told a prayer congregation in Lahore that General Musharraf's policies would "advance vulgarity and lewdness in our society." In particular, Mr. Saeed singled out "the foolish and stupid encouragement of men and women to run together in marathon races, and efforts to give legal sanction to the killer sport of kite-flying." Islamists in Pakistan oppose kite-flying during Basant, a Punjab-wide peasant festival.

Despite its invective against General Musharraf, though, the Lashkar continues to operate with impunity in Pakistan. On January 3, for example, Jamaat-ud-Dawa volunteers delivered meat from animals sacrificed during Eid to prisoners at Lahore's Central Jail and Camp Jail. Noting that many prisoners "had been locked up for petty crimes," a Jamaat press release stated that the organisation had "decided to pay the fines of these poor inmates so that they can go home and begin their lives anew and become productive citizens."

For reasons that analysts are divided on, General Musharraf has proved either unwilling or unable to confront his Islamist opponents. In recent hearings of the United States' House Armed Service Committee, Congressman Hank Johnson publicly aired what anyone following Pakistan's courageous journalists has long known: "that the Pakistani intelligence service continues to collaborate with the Taliban and other insurgent groups operating out of its border regions." Pressure is mounting on the General to make his choice — and soon.

Source : The Hindu

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                    30 September 2006

Arms imbalances in the subcontinent

By Ahmed Khan

THE supply of non-nuclear technology to India under the Indo- US Agreement on Nuclear Cooperation gives India access to hundreds of nuclear labs and nuclear R&D institutions in the United States. The significance should be obvious.

Benefiting greatly from US nuclear technology, the 22 Indian nuclear reactors could continue producing weapons grade uranium for several years. After that, 14 reactors will come under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, but eight unsupervised Indian reactors could produce an unlimited amount of weapons grade uranium.

In effect, India could manufacture hundreds of nuclear weapons to fit on intercontinental ballistic missiles, intermediate-range ballistic missiles and tactical missiles. In Pakistan, which is involved with internal problems, this development is not getting the attention it deserves.

The other more serious development is that the US defence industry, taking advantage of the Indo-US nuclear pact, is trying to secure defence contracts worth billions of dollars from the Indian armed forces. Advanced technology F-16 and F-18 fighter aircraft, latest scanned array radars (AESA), multi-role helicopters, submarines, frigates, Long Range Maritime Patrol (LRMP) aircraft, and AWACS have been offered to India. Arming India to the teeth would impact on India’s neighbours especially China and Pakistan. At present, 70 per cent of Indian military weapons are of Russian origin. There is a realisation that America has the best high-tech weapons, especially fighter aircraft and air defence equipment, which could enable India to establish hegemony in South Asia and primacy in the region.

One of the biggest deals underway involves India’s plans to buy 126 new multi-role jet fighters for the Indian Air Force, valued at around 10 billion dollars. Lockheed Martin, the biggest aircraft manufacturing company in the world, has made an offer to sell 126 Block 50-52 F-16 fighters jets, with technology transfer. Boeing Co the biggest manufacturer of passenger jetliners has offered AE/F Super Hornet fighters at a comparable price.

It is worth mentioning that while the US has agreed to sell 36 F-16 fighters to Pakistan at the exorbitant price of five billion dollars, 126 F-16s are being offered to India for 10 billion dollars only.

The government needs to clarify, why Lockheed Martin is charging Pakistan, a non-Nato ally, a price that is far higher than the one being offered to India.

India is negotiating a deal with Lockheed Martin to build most of the F-16 jet fighters by HAL at Bangalore. Why has Pakistan failed to negotiate a similar agreement to assemble/build F-16s at the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex at Kamra? Was technology transfer a requirement taken up with the Bush administration and with Lockheed Martin? And what was their response? Are the US and Lockheed Martin taking Pakistan for a ride by charging a much higher rate? In the past, $658 million were paid to Lockheed for the supply of 28 F-16 fighters. The supply of the F-16s was blocked and the huge amount paid was not returned.

The Indian Air Force has 230 modern frontline combat aircraft — 190 Russian SU-30 MK and 40 Mirage 2000 strike aircraft, compared to only 32 F-16s with the PAF. With 126 additional fifth-generation fighters, the IAF’s fighter strike and combat capability will increase to 356 highly multi-role aircraft, capable of striking deep into Pakistan. With 36 additional F-16 Falcons, the PAF will have a total of 68 F-16 aircraft after 10 years. The five to one imbalance of combat aircraft, will tilt the ratio of air power dangerously in favour of India.

Lockheed Martin aims to outsource aircraft components to enable India to sell its highly successful C-130 transport aircraft for the Indian Air Force. The IAF transport fleet is already four times the size of the PAF transport fleet of C-130 Charlies. The PAF has been operating the C-130 most successfully, especially in the Northern Areas, since decades. Besides increased airlift capability, C-130 aircraft will enhance the Indian army’s para-drop capability.

The American avionic firm Raytheon has already confirmed its readiness to supply India with its most advanced “electronically active scanned array radar (AESA), which steers radar beams at nearly the speed of light. The system is much lighter and more accurate than conventional radar systems. This electronic asset would significantly enhance the war fighting capabilities of the Indian Air Force.

Neither AESA nor the F-18 Super Hornet has been offered to Pakistan. The discrimination against Pakistan is more than clear. The US has offered the Patriot Anti-Missile Missile System to India, while India is negotiating the purchase of Arrow AMM’s from Israel. Indian Air Force AWACS and the new AMMs and AESA radars will enhance the IAF’s capability to intercept incoming missiles and intruder aircraft.

Bell, the American aerospace giant, has almost settled an order for the supply of 197 multi-role helicopters, including large numbers of gunship helicopters for the use of the Indian army and air force. The Bell helicopter deal is valued at $500 million. Bell has also offered India assistance for the development and manufacture of attack helicopters at home. The Indian army wants to buy 64 Bell attack helicopters immediately. The remaining 137 will be manufactured under licence at HAL Bangalore. With 197 new Bell helicopters and 250 Chetaks and Cheeta helicopters, the army’s offensive capabilities will significantly enhance.

The Indian navy’s shopping list includes six submarines, three frigates, eight Long Range Maritime Patrol (LRMP) aircraft and Boeing’s Multi-Mission Boeing jets. The 737 is not available until 2009, so the Indian navy is likely to opt for P3C Orions.

The Northrop Grumman Corporation has offered sea-going vessels for the Indian navy’s coastal fleet. It has already signed a deal with HAL Bangalore to supply the components of the Hawkeye AWAC’s offered to the Indian navy and air force.

India’s defence budget has been steadily growing with its economy. There are indications that the defence budget will increase to 22 billion dollars during the coming fiscal year. Capital expenditure on new weapon acquisitions has increased from 25 per cent in 2000 to 42 per cent during the current fiscal year.

This massive arming of India will create a serious security situation for countries in the region including Pakistan, China, Iran, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and the Near and Far East as well as the Middle East region. The matter should have been discussed at the Non-Aligned Summit in Havana. Something must be done to stop the arms race being triggered by the United States in South Asia.

The writer is a retired air marshal of the Pakistan Air Force.
Source : dawn.com

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                    19 August 2006

What the U.S. is doing to Pakistan

Amit Baruah

Washington's influence in "core" areas of Pakistan's security seems to be growing. And this is not restricted to mere cooperation in anti-terrorist actions.

NEW STRANDS in an emerging "strategic" relationship between Pakistan and the United States, carefully crafted after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, demand the attention of all those interested in South Asian dynamics. The 9/11 attacks were a wake-up call for Washington and the West: the cost of abandoning Afghanistan to the Taliban and the growth of an extremist polity in Pakistan was too high a price for the U.S. to pay.

Apart from cracking down on Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the U.S., after publicly "busting" the A.Q. Khan nuclear smuggling ring in January 2004, has shown that nuclear non-proliferation is a key objective of American policy towards Pakistan. Soon after 9/11, the then U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, put Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf on notice — you are either with us or against us. The General had little choice in the matter: he had to be "with" the Americans.

the past four years, American influence in "core" areas of Pakistan's security seems to be growing. This, clearly, is not restricted to mere cooperation in anti-terrorist actions or using Pakistan as a logistical base for Afghan operations.

Indication of true goals

The clearest intention yet of American goals in Pakistan was demonstrated during a hearing of the U.S. House International Relations Committee on July 20, in which John Hillen, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs in the State Department, was a witness. Mr. Hillen makes no secret in his testimony that the U.S. believes in manipulating Pakistan in a direction that Washington believes is desirable and would result in an overall increase of American comfort levels in a country, which has been proud of its sovereignty and independence.

Answering questions about the proposed sale of 36 F-16 aircraft to Pakistan, Mr. Hillen said an "unprecedented" security plan had been agreed to by Islamabad: "We, of course, have had a U.S. government security survey of their bases and facilities. We've put into the deal that they must comply with the approved security plans for their F-16-related bases and facilities before we'll release any systems in the sale. We will have a U.S. presence to monitor compliance with the security plan requirements, a very enhanced and end-use monitoring program[me].

"Routine access to F-16 aircraft equipment and munitions is in restricted areas and limited to Pakistan air force personnel that are pre-approved for such. There is a two-man rule, so to speak, for access to this equipment and restricted areas, and F-16 flights outside of Pakistan ... must be approved in advance by the United States government."

In effect, the American official is saying that any flight by these 36 F-16 aircraft, say, hypothetically, against Afghanistan, must be approved by Washington. Islamabad will have to submit to American controls on how these aircraft are used despite paying for them! And, that is not all. Mr. Hillen says clearly that these F-16s will not be able to deliver a nuclear weapon. Asked how the Bush administration would be able to prevent another A.Q. Khan from appearing, the U.S. official said: "... as we get into closed session, I'll get in even to more detail on the security plan, but I would note that we have — for precisely to combat unauthorised proliferation, we have this extraordinary security plan put into place."

The American official is blunt in his comments. "We place all sorts of conditionality onto getting arms sales from the United States that protects American security interests and that protects exactly the sort of proliferation problem you alluded to. So I think this [F-16] sale works to exactly the opposite.

"I think it will give us access and influence in a country and in which we'll be able to see if there are any dynamics of that sort and be able to be involved in a leadership position, rather than just standing by if this happens," Mr. Hill told one of the House Committee members.

The ultimate fear that seems to be driving the U.S. is the following: what happens to Pakistani nuclear weapons in case an extremist, Islamist leadership was to capture power in that country? From time to time, there have been suggestions that the Americans want to be in a position to "secure" these nuclear weapons. Mr. Hillen's comments only go to confirm that the U.S. wants to be in a position to tackle any "unauthorised proliferation" in Pakistan.

Mr. Hillen's remarks are of a piece with what U.S. officials have been quietly telling the Indian side about Pakistan's nuclear weapons — that they have access to strategic sites and are also in a position to monitor three-fourths of Pakistan's air space.

Whatever be the actual situation, India's relaxed response to the F-16 sale is predicated on the conditionalities built into the transfer. With the U.S. enticing Pakistan into a security structure that involves direct involvement by American personnel, there are clear implications for India-Pakistan relations as well.

The Americans are attempting to be in a position to take on a "leadership role" if a proliferation problem were to take place once again in Pakistan. Is this the price that Washington has been able to extract in lieu of letting off the Pakistani military in the nuclear supermarket run by A.Q. Khan? That certainly seems to be the case.
Source : The Hindu

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                    31 July 2006

India-Pakistan trade stuck on SAFTA

Nirupama Subramanian

CAN TRADE improve relations between hostile countries, or are better trade relations between two countries possible only after settlement of all disputes? China and Japan have shown they can have good trade relations despite long-standing differences. In the case of India and Pakistan, the question is far from settled.

Pakistan, a signatory of the South Asia Free Trade Agreement, which went operational on July 1, has said that with India, it will implement the agreement only in line with its existing bilateral trade policy. That means, Pakistan's trade with India will continue to be governed by a positive list, which allows only 773 items to be imported from India. Only on these will Pakistan reduce tariffs in line with SAFTA. India also wants Pakistan to give it Most Favoured Nation status. That would have become a non-issue had Pakistan implemented SAFTA fully for India.

Underlying Pakistan's refusal to do so is the argument that liberalisation of trade has to be linked to progress on resolution of long-standing disputes between the two countries, the "core" issue being that of Kashmir. Pakistan dismisses New Delhi's position that trade must not be held hostage to the settlement of a long-standing problem.

So it is surprising that the State Bank of Pakistan — the country's central bank — decided recently to put out a report that departs from this traditional argument. The report and its conclusions bear no relation to Pakistan's official trade policy with India.

The report, which was released on July 10, says Pakistan stands to save between $400 million and $900 million on its import bill if it would expand the positive list and allow imports from India of goods that it presently imports from other countries at higher cost. There are 2,646 items that are common in Pakistan's imports and Indian exports. The report, based on 2003-2004 data, says that after excluding the items that are on the positive list for India, 45 per cent of the items could be imported by Pakistan at lesser cost from India than the current cost of import from the rest of the world.

For instance, in the iron and steel sector, the report says Indian imports are on the whole not as cheap as Iran's. But it identifies 47 products that are cheaper to import from India.

It also points to chemicals and pharmaceutical products. In these sectors, Pakistan's imports from India were 4.3 per cent and 6.8 per cent respectively, of its total imports in these sectors. As many as 166 of these items cost less to import from India than from other countries.

For sure, the paper argues that trade liberalisation is not a one-way street and points to tariff and non-tariff barriers in India that discourage Pakistani exporters, despite India having given the MFN status to Pakistan as far back as 1996. It says that unless these barriers are brought down, Pakistan cannot gain from bilateral trade, the potential for which, according to estimates, ranges from $0.75 billion to $6.25 billion.

In 2005-2006, bilateral trade was over $800 million, more than double what it was in 2003-2004. Informal trade could be as high as $2 billion.

"Complete elimination of tariffs under SAFTA may increase the intra-regional trade by 1.6 times the existing level. At the aggregate level, Pakistan and India could increase their bilateral trade by 79 percent, by entering a PTA [preferential trade agreement]."

Positive spin-off

Most surprisingly, the report asserts that an increase in trade links will have a positive spin-off for the troubled relations between the two countries.

This is also India's position. But the Pakistan commerce ministry seems unimpressed by the report. When Commerce Minister Humayun Akhtar Khan recently announced the country's trade policy for 2007, he said trade with India would continue under the existing regime. He said equal treatment with India under SAFTA would not be possible "until there is progress towards resolution of some political disputes between the two countries including the Kashmir issue."
Source : The Hindu

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 6 June 2006

Taking a wrong turn

Vikram Sood

Different states react differently to similar situations. When Israel is subjected to terrorist attacks, which is very often, the State reacts immediately and with force each time. In India, two days after Pakistan-backed terrorists kill innocent civilians in Srinagar, we send an official delegation to talk about cooperation in the war against terrorism with the sponsors of terrorism. There is no pretence of postponing the meeting. It is as incongruous as the London Police seeking the help of Jack the Ripper to find Jack the Ripper.

The Iranians, too, have a lesson to teach. As the world watches, they have shown that if you know what you want, you have the rules on your side and have the courage to stand up to all pressures, the other side will ultimately blink first. One does not have to roll over and play dead at the first opportunity.

Talking with the Pakistanis about curbing terrorism is a dialogue of the deaf. We say stop the violence; they agree, but say that Indian security forces must stop killing innocents. We say stop the infiltration; they demand the withdrawal of Indian troops. We call it terrorism; they call it a freedom struggle. When a terrorist is killed, they call him a martyr. They glorify their suicide terrorists by calling them fidayeen; alas, unthinkingly we do likewise.

Meanwhile, Pakistan has no intention of rolling back its jehadi infrastructure. This is a vital low-cost weapon they have. So the embers are kept burning with vicious anti-India, anti-Israel and anti-US campaigns that get detailed coverage in the thriving jehadi press. The campaign to curtail the jehadi outfits and control madrassas is an elaborate charade.

What really happens is that the Pakistani intelligence establishment periodically does a cleaning operation and shuts down some outfits to launch new ones to prevent anyone from becoming too powerful. This is mistakenly seen as an example of enlightened moderation. In reality, these are just revolving door tactics: exit an old outfit and enter a new one in a different costume.

All is not too well with the Musharraf realm as election year approaches. Suddenly, the throne is looking vulnerable with Washington now beginning to grumble sotto voce that Musharraf is not doing enough in the global war on terror. There is irritation with endless Musharraf double-speak along with assistance to the Taliban and a growing realisation that democracy in Pakistan may not be such a bad option. The jehadis are complaining that Musharraf has sold Pakistan to the Americans and lost Kashmir to the Hindus. Balochistan and Waziristan are in ferment.

Meanwhile in Pakistan, Sunnis kill Shias, Deobandhis kill Barelvis, Shias and Ahmediyas while they shed crocodile tears for the Kashmiris. And far away, in London, their political voice gagged in Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif have issued their magna carta, which seeks and hopes to curb the Pakistan armed forces substantially. Whether this remains yet another Pakistani dream for democracy or becomes a reality depends on how seriously the rest of the world takes this Charter of Democracy.

Left to himself, Musharraf would only be too eager to revoke his promises to Pakistanis once again and is working on a scheme to continue as Pakistan’s dictator in democratic clothing beyond 2007. Any agreement on Kashmir now, in any form, will give Musharraf a victory that he badly needs, and ensure his continuance in perpetuity.

In this context, for Indians to scurry around and offer palliatives to Musharraf is completely misplaced. Terminologies like autonomy, self-governance, self-rule, joint sovereignty and open borders are being bandied around like some magic solution. How can there be autonomy for Kashmir and not for Haryana? Can there be self-rule in Kashmir but not in Assam? In any case, are not all states in India self-ruled by the people of the state? How can there be joint sovereignty with Pakistan when it cannot even grant us MFN status or screen Hindi films? And what is this rubbish about soft or open borders with someone who regularly sends armed terrorists across? How can we accuse Pakistan of aiding terrorism in India and also have open borders?

The Prime Minister’s visit to Srinagar was greeted by a shutdown and a boycott by that group of the ‘unelected and unelectables’ called the Hurriyat. Violence and a rebuff must have been anticipated. So when the visit was cut short by a day, Pak TV smirked and the jehadi underworld gloated. It is not just what a government does but how it does it that is important.

After the Hurriyat leaders’ long sojourn in Pakistan earlier this year, they had met the PM in New Delhi. An arrangement of a cycle of meetings in Islamabad, New Delhi and Srinagar, making it appear a tripartite discussion with the Hurriyat as the third party, has hopefully been abandoned. New Delhi should now be talking with only those who had the courage and the wisdom to participate in the electoral process.

Human beings have the great facility to rationalise situations and pursue a manifestly futile path on occasion. Talking to these so-called moderates is one such rationalisation. The Hurriyat is a secessionist organisation put together by Pakistan. Have we ever heard of a moderate secessionist or a patriotic traitor? And how can there be a meeting of minds with secessionists? Not one of the Hurriyat leaders had the courage to condemn the murderers of innocent civilians. This is not surprising because some of them do not even have the courage to name the murderers of their own fathers.

One could however, pity the Hurriyat for it lives under constant threat — obey or else. It fears its own extremists more than its mentors across. That is why it needs the protection of the Indian State — one of the ironies of the Kashmir question.

The other irony of the situation in Kashmir is that all socio-economic indicators compare favourably with the rest of the country. Its per capita income is slightly lower than the national average; its literacy level is on par; its population below poverty line is the best in the country; it receives the largest resource transfer and grants from the central government. Places like Hyderpora, Rajbagh and Barzulla look completely transformed, as palaces owned by locals have mushroomed in Srinagar — wages of insurgency or profits of office, apparently.

It is, therefore, not a case of resource crunch in Kashmir. It is abysmally poor governance despite a bloated bureaucracy that simply milks the system. There is little attention to provision of good roads, adequate power or even sanitation. Correct this, provide law and order and a large portion of the grievances will disappear.

After all these years of relentless animosity, Pakistan finds itself rated very highly as a failed State by a US think-tank. Obviously, such endless animosity is debilitating. A situation of this kind in our neighbourhood will naturally affect us as well. The solution does not lie in seemingly magnanimous gestures that strengthen the stranglehold of the Pakistan army. This would be a retrograde step for India. Such gestures are sometimes used by victorious States as a weapon of real politik, but in the Indo-Pak context, this stage does not exist. Such gestures are, therefore, invariably portrayed in Islamabad as appeasement.

The reality of the situation is that there are no quick solutions and it is a long haul, chiefly because an increasingly ‘jehadised’ Pakistan army must somehow renege from its Faustian bargain and retrieve its soul from Mephistopheles.
Source : Hindustan Times

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 11 May 2006

Height of folly

Vikram Sood

Perspectives: Strategic advantage in Siachen can’t be given up for short-term political gains.

The story doing the rounds in Delhi is that in another exhibition of generosity, India is about to withdraw from the Saltoro Ridge (commonly referred to as the Siachen Glacier) in the interest of peace, but without securing the country’s strategic interests.

Search for peace is indisputably desirable but to try and attain it through magnanimity will only trump realism. Peace is usually possible when there is so much mutual trust that agreements are a natural corollary, or when one of the antagonists is so totally vanquished that the victor can make him sign practically anything, or if both the antagonists are completely exhausted and there is a realisation that the only answer is peace.

In the India-Pakistan context, the level of distrust remains very high despite the efforts of some nostalgic dream merchants. Pakistan has not called an unequivocal and permanent end to using its jehadist weapon in India. Worse, it is spreading its use to the rest of India. There is also collusion with Bangladeshi jehadists.

It was this distrust of Pakistan’s intentions that led the Indian Army to occupy the Saltoro Ridge in 1984. Saltoro was attained by our soldiers after considerable sacrifice and at huge costs to the nation. One of the spins currently given to support calls for withdrawal is that the expenses and the loss of life are unbearable. Neither is correct. The army claims it is now down to zero weather- and terrain-related casualty. An expenditure of Rs 2 crore a day out of a budget of Rs 80,000 crore is small change. To give up territory just because there is no habitation there or it is expensive is to let sacrifices go in vain and keep yourself open to repeat intrusions later.

The lay of the land is such that any vacation of this territory without iron-clad guarantees would enable Pakistan to occupy the ridge with comparative ease. Reoccupation by Indian forces would then be virtually impossible and we would have to open another front elsewhere. It is difficult to imagine how this could be achieved as international pressure on India not to retaliate would be immediate and massive. We all know how much pressure was brought upon us following the attack on Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001.

The Indian Army had climbed to the Saltoro Ridge for a distinctly military objective. This was to cut off Pakistan’s access to areas that would enable it to reach the Karakoram Pass and link with China and be able to threaten Ladakh; the Saltoro Ridge provided Indian forces with strategic heights looking into Pak-occupied Gilgit and Baltistan. Strategic advantage cannot be given up for some obscure short-term political advantage without a document to establish one’s credentials. Withdrawal from the Saltoro heights without any exchange of authenticated documents and carefully delineated positions would be the height of all follies, tantamount to retreat.

Pakistan’s unwillingness to sign any document that authenticates the Agreed Ground Position Line (AGPL) could only mean that it would seek to break it at first dawn. There is neither a change of heart nor intentions. Kargil 1999 was the latest military attempt to alter the ground position in Kashmir and particularly to negate the advantage India had in Saltoro.

India has the dubious distinction of being the only country to give up strategic advantages repeatedly. In 1948, when the Pakistani forces were retreating, we did not secure Muzaffarabad, Bagh, Kotli or Skardu. In 1966, we gave up Haji Pir, through which infiltrators keep coming into the Kashmir Valley even today. In 1972, we gave up territory and 93,000 PoWs for an agreement that Pakistan never intended to observe.

Are we now about to repeat more of this sorry history? One is afraid that this may be so. The problem is that we seem to be eager to give up strategic advantage for short-term political gains and to look good internationally. There is little reason for India to accept an unfavourable arrangement today when our position is much stronger than in the Nineties. It is logical to ask if we are now willing to accept this unfair arrangement with a regime that has not given up its primary goal of creating caliphates in India.

There were times between 1989 and 1992 when it appeared that a settlement on the Saltoro issue was about to be clinched. By then, the Pakistan army was getting ready to redeploy its jehadi army, demobilised from the Afghan theatre to the Kashmir front, and an agreement on Saltoro did not fit into the scheme of things. Boastful Pakistani diplomats even claimed that they would have an ‘agreement’ favourable to Pakistan on Kashmir by 1991. Frustration at the ability of the Indian-State to withstand this ruthless campaign led to the Kargil misadventure in 1999. But by mid-2001, Musharraf had bounced back post-Agra, only to be deflated by an angry America in September 2001.

It is an insecure Musharraf who has to keep reminding Pakistanis that he is the boss when he proclaims all corps commanders are his boys, and the rest of the world that he is no Bush poodle. Washington continues to champion Musharraf as the indispensable frontline ally and wants to give something to Musharraf so that he can transfer troops facing India to do battle in Pakistan’s turbulent west. But these troop transfers have to be done in an atmosphere of triumph for Musharraf, when he can claim that he got the Indians out of Siachen. Caeser must return to Rome in glory.

It is only then that Musharraf hopes his troops will fight other Muslims in revolt in Waziristan and Balochistan. The US has a requirement to keep Musharraf in position. After all, he heads Pakistan’s strongest, best equipped and financially endowed political party — the Pakistan army. But that is not our requirement. India is not obliged to let Musharraf continue in perpetuity. Any concession to him now will ensure him a life beyond 2007. And beyond 2007, even Bush does not care; his time will have begun to run out. One can understand American anxiety to reward their favourite in their askewed global war on terror and secure Pakistani help to tackle Iran but one cannot understand India’s anxiety to please the Americans.

The only way it would not be perceived as a retreat would be if the Pakistanis first agreed to delineate the AGPL in the Siachen sector, which is a part of the large Saltoro Ridge, authenticate this on maps that would then be signed and exchanged by commanders of the two countries. Pakistan would then project the AGPL in all its maps, making the AGPL an extension of the LoC from Point NJ-9842. After this, the two countries would work out the ground rules for demilitarisation. Only after this has been worked out will there be discussion on redeployment and demilitarisation of this sector. Anything short of this will be a sell-out.

Nothing need be agreed to furtively. There is no need to have deals signed in a hurry under the cloak of darkness. We need to debate this openly, and in our Parliament, without the inane recourse to disruptions and walkouts that negate any debate. We are all stakeholders in the peace process but we need to know why we are agreeing to retreat. One does not become a war-mongering cold warrior simply because one wants doubts cleared. Patriotism is not the right of only peaceniks.
Source : Hindustan Times

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 2 May 2006  



Aziz links free trade to Kashmir

* PM says non-tariff barriers also impediment to trade
* Urges greater energy cooperation among SAARC states

Staff Report

ISLAMABAD: Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz said on Monday that free trade with India was not possible without resolving political disputes.

“Our trade relations with India are restricted due to the overall paradigm of our relations,” the prime minister said to a South Asia Free Media Association (SAFMA) delegation. He said non-tariff barriers were also a big impediment to trade between the two countries. “We cannot move towards free trade with India without resolving political issues”.

Aziz said that the Islamabad SAARC summit was a turning point in “our relations (with India) and we are moving forward to further improve these relations”. He said a dialogue process with India was underway, but it was currently too slow and needed to be speeded up.

He said both countries should now also move towards dispute resolution rather than dispute management. He said Kashmir was a core issue which should be resolved according to the aspirations of the Kashmiri people and with the acceptance of both India and Pakistan. The prime minister said Pakistan wanted a Kashmir resolution and that is why it had proposed demilitarisation and self-rule in Kashmir.

Energy cooperation between South Asian countries is of vital importance and could be a key driver of development, he said. Pakistan invited India to join the Pakistan-Iran gas pipeline project, which “we call a peace pipeline and we unbundled it from all other issues”. He said Pakistan was also exploring a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan and had invited India to join it. “We are also working with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to build an energy grid for Pakistan,” he said. To a question, he said there was also a need to settle the water issue with India and stressed the need to abide by the Indus Waters Treaty. He said that anybody was free to invest in Pakistan.

He said a trust deficit and conflicts had prevented South Asia from exploiting its human capital. SAARC had the potential to resolve these issues but it was not working very well, he said.

Aziz said SAARC needed to be energised and its secretariat strengthened. SAARC could be an excellent platform to meet the challenges of globalisation, he added. The prime minister said Pakistan enjoyed close relations with Iran, Afghanistan, the Gulf states, Bangladesh and other SAARC member countries. “Our relations with China are multi-faceted and are expanding in all fields including economy, diplomacy, civil, political, defence and security. We are proud of our seamless relations with China.”

He said Pakistan had a vibrant economy that was growing fast. Due to “our reforms agenda a middle class is emerging and we are on our way to improving living standards by ensuring macro and micro economic stability”.

To a question, Aziz said Pakistan was not interested in an arms race but “we have a strategy to ensure minimum nuclear deterrence to deter any aggression”. He said sanctions after Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998 had helped it become self-reliant in defence.

He said Pakistan was gradually decreasing its defence expenditure and enhancing allocations for social sector improvement and poverty reduction. He said Pakistan was committed to fighting terror and had done more than any country to curb terror. To a question, he said Islam was a religion of peace, harmony and tolerance. He said Islam abhorred terrorism and “we are proud of our faith”. He said there was a need to promote inter-faith harmony.

To another question, he said Pakistan had made successful efforts to improve its image by reforming its economy, transparent leadership and promoting the true image of Islam and still “we are making our best efforts to build inter-faith harmony”.He said the insurgency in Sri Lanka was an internal issue, “but if the Sri Lankan government seeks our assistance, we will think about it”. However, he said, Pakistan hoped that the issue would be resolved through dialogue.”
Source : Daily Times

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