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 2 May 2006

For Nepal & India, the road ahead is difficult
(The Hindu)

Siddharth Varadarajan

Among the hurdles: the parties' lack of confidence, as well as New Delhi's anxiety over the U.N. involvement in the disarmament of the Maoists and elections to a constituent assembly

MOMENTOUS THOUGH the events and accomplishments of the past few weeks have been, the struggle for democracy in Nepal is perhaps entering its most difficult phase only now. As the country moves towards elections to a constituent assembly, the ingenuity and wisdom of not just the Nepalese political forces but also of India will be put to the test. The choices each makes will help to determine whether the `April Revolution' reaches its final destination or disappears in the quicksand of palace intrigue and political cowardice.

Amidst the exhilaration and excitement of the people's movement in Nepal, India's momentary suspension of disbelief following Karan Singh's fatal meeting with King Gyanendra stands out as the one discordant note. Whatever New Delhi intended, people in Kathmandu saw in both the choice of the special envoy and the subsequent Indian endorsement of the monarch's cunning first proclamation a sign that India cast its lot with the palace. To make matters worse, this syndrome of mixed signals - of `tough' messages delivered, sometimes in private, to an intractable monarch by envoys enamoured of kingship, or petrified of the Maoists - continued right up to the bitter end.

At a time when lakhs of people were on the streets protesting King Gyanendra's ploy of asking the Seven-Party Alliance to nominate its Prime Minister and take executive power, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told journalists accompanying him to Hanover that the king was acting in the "right direction." He also needlessly endorsed the discredited two-pillar theory of constitutional monarchy being as indispensable to stability in Nepal as multi-party democracy. In the same unhelpful vein, National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan chipped in from Germany that India might resume arms supplies to the Royal Nepal Army if the situation in the country continued to deteriorate.

Mr. Saran's eleventh-hour intervention - at a press conference last Saturday - that India stood with the people of Nepal and not with any royal pillar retrieved India's standing on the streets of Kathmandu. But unless the underlying problem which plagues India's Nepal policy is tackled, ambiguity is bound to crop up again.

India's Nepal problem has two dimensions, which are interlinked. First, New Delhi does not fully appreciate that a thoroughgoing democracy including a republic, if that is what the Nepalese want, will be good for India. Secondly, subsequent governments have allowed multiple channels of communication which amplify the existing policy dissonance in Delhi and create maximum confusion.

Instead of the Indian embassy and ambassador, acting on the instructions of the Ministry of External Affairs, being the sole conduit for messages between India and the Nepalese establishment and political parties, a large number of interlocutors and busybodies have involved themselves in the process. There are the special envoys with their one-on-one meetings with King Gyanendra, where nobody else knows what is discussed. There are the Ministry of Defence and the Chief of the Army Staff, who believe in running their own lines of communication with the RNA. Then there are tantric interlopers and Hindutva fanatics who further contribute to the radio clutter. More noise also comes from our legion of ex-rajas, rajvadas and `cadets' who have family ties with the Narayanhiti Palace and who intercede at crucial moments with the ruling party to ensure that India does not side with the people of Nepal.

Somewhere in the middle of this unholy mess are the intelligence agencies, which also appear not to know what India should be doing. For example, their agents turned a blind eye to meetings between the Nepal Maoists and the SPA, which were crucial to the mass mobilisation witnessed on the streets of Kathmandu in April. But their boss, India's intelligence czar, worries endlessly about the security threat posed by the Maoists and is reportedly keen on turning the RNA's weapons tap back on again.

Misplaced anxiety

India might have muddled its way through the thicket of policy dissonance to emerge, finally, on the side of the people, but there is one major obstacle still to be overcome. This is the official anxiety about allowing the United Nations to play a role in the implementation of the SPA-Maoist road map for peace.

Now that Nepal's Parliament has unanimously passed a resolution calling for elections to a constituent assembly, it is time for both Kathmandu and New Delhi to get serious about how those elections are to be conducted. Since the Maoists are unlikely to surrender their arms until after the palace's military powers are neutralised, some kind of international supervision will be needed to provide assurances of a level playing field to all during elections to the constituent assembly and even while the body meets. The Maoists say they are prepared to confine their armed fighters to the barracks under U.N. supervision pending elections and their eventual integration into a new national army along with elements of the RNA. Such a formula provides the only viable option for insurgency to end peacefully. But without international oversight, this is impossible to implement. For obvious reasons, India cannot involve itself in this process and would not want the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) there either. Nor would India want the task executed by a `contact group' led, inevitably, by European countries which are part of Nato's overall command structure. Are there countries, then, that New Delhi can trust? Whose involvement in supervising the sequestering of the Maoists would not compromise India's sense of national interest? These are questions the South Block needs to start asking with a sense of urgency.

In many ways, the U.N. would be the best vehicle. But some sections of the Indian establishment are paranoid about the implications the U.N. involvement in a South Asian election process might have for Kashmir. Such anxieties are completely misplaced. Apart from climate, Nepal and Kashmir have nothing in common. And if the peace process were to falter for want of a via media to manage the entry of the Maoists into competitive politics, it would be King Gyanendra, who ultimately stands to benefit.

Dangers ahead

So momentous have the changes of the past few weeks been that it is tempting to conclude that the king is already history. This would be a serious mistake. King Gyanendra may not be able to utilise his constitutional powers to dismiss Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala or Parliament - if he did, he would have to contend with a full-blown insurrection that would end with either his flight or execution. But he has managed to buy time for himself, a commodity that is infinitely more useful today than are legal provisions. In the most optimistic scenario, elections to a constituent assembly are surely more than a year away. That provides plenty of time for intrigue behind the scenes. The king also knows he is dealing with political parties which lack confidence in their ability to carry the people's movement forward. Ideally, the SPA should have announced the restoration of Parliament itself. But it didn't have the gumption to do so. Mr. Koirala did well to refuse to take the oath to the Rajparishad but there are many in Nepal who would have found his being sworn in Prime Minister by King Gyanendra a distasteful event.

Mr. Koirala has also failed immediately to operationalise the promise he held out last week of a military ceasefire to reciprocate the three-month ceasefire declared by the Maoists. To make matters worse, an RNA helicopter on Saturday opened fire on a public meeting organised by the Maoists in the Sunwal area of Nawalparasi district. Was this the last act of defiance by an army, which knows it will soon have to change course, or a warning shot to the SPA, of which it is still the boss?

One mistake Mr. Koirala, the SPA and India should avoid making is to disregard the role played by the Maoists in last week's peaceful revolution on the streets. The Maoist slogan of a constituent assembly is what fired the imagination of the people, both as an end in itself and as a way of bringing the insurgents into the mainstream and ending the decade-long armed conflict. The Maoists also mobilised their cadres and sympathisers, in Kathmandu, Dang and elsewhere. True, Maoist leaders Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai lashed out at the SPA for welcoming the king's second proclamation restoring Parliament. But they quickly followed this up with two conciliatory gestures: the lifting of their blockade and a three-month ceasefire.

Mr. Koirala must move swiftly to capitalise on this opening and immediately order the RNA to declare a ceasefire too. Along with removing the terrorist tag from the Maoists and releasing all political prisoners, a ceasefire is necessary to start the dialogue process. He also needs to signal, right from the outset, that the RNA is fully subordinate to Parliament. On its part, India should impress upon the Koirala Government the need for a ceasefire and undertake not to resume arms supplies until it is clear that the RNA reports to Parliament and not the palace.

 

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 26 April 2006

A people's victory (The Hindu)

The announcement by King Gyanendra restoring Nepal's Parliament that was dissolved in 2002 is a historic victory for the country's pro-democracy movement. It is a true measure of what a genuine people-based movement can achieve in the face of the most repressive brutality. In the last few days, the movement led by the Seven Party Alliance grew spontaneously into a mass agitation that refused to be cowed down by shoot-at-sight orders, curfew and other strong-arm tactics of the Palace. Such was the strength of the movement that the King - after a proclamation on April 21 that pretended to restore democracy but was recognised as a ploy to hang on to power - had no option but to announce a full retreat three days later. The revival of the dissolved House of Representatives was the main demand of the SPA. Its quick nomination - without the unseemly bickering that had characterised similar exercises in the past - of Girija Prasad Koirala as the consensus choice for Prime Minister speaks of the maturity it has gained during the anti-King struggle. The Alliance has also done well to assert at once that the reinstated Parliament will immediately pass resolutions for negotiations with the Maoists and for holding Constituent Assembly elections. With this, the SPA has reiterated its commitment to the agreement it reached with Maoists in November 2005 and March 2006 for the formation of a Constituent Assembly. For sure, the demand for a Constituent Assembly is no longer restricted to the Maoists, who are committed to the abolition of the monarchy and establishing a republic. As the full-throated slogans during the 18-day agitation indicated, there is now a widespread demand for re-examining the role of the monarchy. The SPA knows it must act in the spirit of that struggle.

While the Maoist rejection of the reinstatement of the House takes some fizz out of the victory celebrations in the SPA camp, it was not unexpected. From the time the democratic alliance and the Maoists reached their agreement, both sides differed on the route to a Constituent Assembly. The Maoists were emphatic about immediate elections to a Constituent Assembly; the SPA wanted this after the revival of the parliament. The Maoist attack on an army camp within hours of the April 24 royal proclamation was a violent reminder that the main challenge now is to bring the insurgents on board the democratic process. But if the difference is only over the timing, it can be surmounted by the SPA calling for Constituent Assembly elections at once. The resolution that the democratic parties intend to pass in Parliament could even provide a definite time frame for holding the elections. The last thing the SPA can afford now is to get lulled into complacency by its triumph. The people of Nepal have won an important battle. They must guard against the dangers that still lurk on the road to a stable democracy, peace, and prosperity.

 

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 24 April 2006

New Delhi out of step (The Hindu)

After doing the right thing on Nepal for more than a year, India runs the risk of putting itself out of step with the Himalayan kingdom's inspiring democratic revolution by betting on King Gyanendra's last throw of the dice. The Ministry of External Affairs' inept endorsement of his proclamation and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's assessment that "by and large whatever moves the King has made... are in the right direction" demonstrate how much official Indian policy lags behind fast-moving political developments in a neighbouring country. When it comes to the Nepalese monarchy, the Indian establishment seems to have a comprehension problem. The democratic movement spearheaded by the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) has its own roadmap and agenda, the core elements of which are the revival of the House of Representatives and a constituent assembly to settle the future of the Nepali polity. The issue of bringing Maoists into the democratic polity is an inescapable part of this agenda. King Gyanendra, on the other hand, seeks desperately to impose his own terms on the restoration of multi-party democracy. He wants to preserve as much of his executive power as he can get away with, including the `Henry VIII clause' (Article 127 of the 1990 Constitution) - which he fraudulently invoked in February 2005 to subvert parliamentary democracy - his absolute immunity, his control over the Army, and his emergency powers. By way of damage limitation, Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran has now sought to explain that the MEA's endorsement of Friday's royal offer was limited to the principle that executive power should be returned to the people. When New Delhi spoke of the twin pillars of constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy, Mr. Saran explained, it was "reflecting only what the people of Nepal and the political parties in Nepal have wanted. If today or tomorrow the people of Nepal wish to see a different future for themselves, different kind of political arrangements for themselves, that is for the people of Nepal ... not for India to decide."

It is in the spirit of these observations that India must develop its Nepal policy during this crucial period when the kingdom is going through a revolution on the streets. Far from adding its voice to the conservative external view that the SPA should accept the King's offer, India should be a great reserve of strength for the democratic forces. The continuous curfew in Kathmandu and the suspension of cellular services demonstrate the increasing desperation of King Gyanendra and his isolation from political reality. Instead of leaning on the parties, the international community should step up the pressure on the King to go along with the SSA's roadmap - or if he is constitutionally unable to do that, go for good. There is no way the parties will walk into the trap of forming a government under the slippery terms he has set. Once in the hot seat, they will soon find themselves unable to push their roadmap; there is also the possibility of the people power, which has forced the King to go this far, dissipating. This may be the King's game plan.

 

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 19 April 2006

Reconciliation, the only way (Pioneer)


Ashok K Mehta

Nepal's Lali Guras (rhododendron) Revolution has entered its 14th day, well beyond the original four days. The situation in Kathmandu is extremely fluid and uncertain. The countdown to seal the fate of King Gyanendra and monarchy has started. It seems certain that the King will have to drop his plan for the restoration of absolute monarchy. True, Kathmandu may not have collected 500,000 pro-democracy activists as predicted by jailed UML leader Madhav Nepal. But the spontaneity and momentum of the protests have surprised everyone. The Royal regime was supremely confident of controlling the demonstrations that have made ordinary people join hands with political parties - students, teachers, doctors, civil servants - almost everyone is out on the streets. By announcing a third unilateral ceasefire (restricted to Kathmandu valley) the Maoists have renewed their commitment to joining the political mainstream.

Undeterred by the curfew and excessive use of force by the security personnel, the people's movement has turned into a popular uprising. The internal upheaval was given a boost by an emphatic call from the US and EU for the King to restore democracy immediately. India has played a key role in facilitating an alliance between Maoists and political parties, making a tripolar fight, bipolar. India is no longer parroting the twin-pillar policy of constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy. It has discreetly dropped reference to monarchy but still calls for reconciliation between the King and the political parties. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's special envoy Mr Karan Singh is on the royal net and will counsel the King on restraint and dialogue. But the King is a very rigid man. And unlike his brother Birendra, he will be loath to receive advice, especially from India.

Kathmandu has a history of mystique. Among the prevalent myths, one is that the King has enormous public support and that he is a unifying force and with him gone, Nepal would lapse into a political vacuum and chaos. King Gyanendra believes he is the panacea to Nepal's ills. He is, after all, seen as the reincarnation of Lord Vishnu. He is known to tell people: His family created Nepal, he lost a brother due to a fractious multiparty democracy, he is the biggest democrat and so on... But everyone knows he despises the political class. He says he was forced into direct rule due to the inefficiency and corruption of politicians and in order to save Nepal from becoming a failed state. In turn, he promised to provide good governance, defeat the Maoists and hold elections to Parliament that four of his Prime Ministers had failed to do.

At the time he took over, people said: Let's give the King a chance. Sadly, 14 months after assuming direct charge of the state, Nepal is considerably worse off. The local election was hollow, the Maoists remain unchastened and, if anything, stronger. Worse, democracy is nowhere in sight. The King has taken Nepal into a hole, not because few had read his true intentions but no one was able or willing to call his bluff. In fact, he was encouraged by the US to defeat the Maoist terrorists. Otherwise, they would seize power. This unseasoned advice was construed as political support by the Royal regime. China, Pakistan and Russia played no mean part in providing moral and material assistance to a beleaguered regime.

 

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 24 March 2006

Common ground against Gyanendra (The Hindu)

The "second understanding" between the democratic political parties of Nepal and the Maoists is certain to inject fresh energy in the agitation against King Gyanendra. The two sides first reached an agreement in November 2005 that allowed them to work in concert to boycott the February 2006 municipal elections. The success of the boycott showed that, by acting together, the seven-party Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) and the Maoists could isolate Nepal's monarchy. The March 19 agreement is a reiteration that they will work together for "full democracy." Its immediate consequence was the Maoist decision to end a week-long blockade of Kathmandu that had resulted in considerable disruption of civilian life. The Maoists have instead pledged to mobilise forces for the ARD's mass agitation from April 6, significantly a day after the high school examinations end.

The agreement does not mask the differences between the political parties and the Maoists. That they chose to make separate statements is evidence enough that the political parties want to keep their identity distinct from that of the Maoists. While explaining the absence of a joint statement, Girija Prasad Koirala, leader of the Nepali Congress, spoke of "international difficulties," an apparent reference to the open hostility of the United States, and the ambivalence of India, to the Maoists. The political leadership counts the backing of both countries, more so India's, as crucial to the struggle. But it is also true the political parties themselves are wary of the Maoists, who remain committed to armed struggle. It is to the credit of both sides that these differences did not prevent them from agreeing on the greater political cause of defeating the anti-democratic plans of King Gyanendra.

 

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 22 February 2006

U.S. and India part company on Nepal (The Hindu)
Siddharth Varadarajan

Washington has denounced an agreement between the Maoists and the Nepalese parliamentary parties that New Delhi sets.

THE UNITED States and India, never fully on the same page as far as King Gyanendra's illegal seizure of power in Nepal was concerned, have now decisively parted company with Washington publicly opposing a key aspect of Indian policy: the need for the Nepalese parliamentary parties and Maoists to make common cause for the restoration of democracy in the Himalayan kingdom.

On February 15, James F. Moriarty, the American Ambassador in Kathmandu, delivered a blistering attack on the agreement reached last November between the Nepalese Maoists and the parliamentary parties, an agreement that has the implicit support of the Indian Government.

The 12-point agreement of November 22, 2005, commits the parties and the Maoists to a common struggle against the "autocratic monarchy" of King Gyanendra and to the establishment of "lasting peace" through elections for a constituent assembly. The Maoists also declared their willingness to participate in multiparty democracy and internationally supervised elections — a commitment reiterated recently by their leader, Prachanda, in an interview to The Hindu .

According to Mr. Moriarty, all of this is a ruse and the political parties are making a big mistake in joining hands with the Maoists against the palace. In prepared remarks aimed at sending a clear warning both to the parties and to India — which has encouraged the parties to work with the Maoists — the U.S. Ambassador said the 12-point agreement was "wrong-headed" and "fraught with danger." Accusing the parties of "wish[ing] away... the uncomfortable fact that their Maoist partners are committed to violence to achieve political ends," he posed three questions to the backers of the agreement. Are the Maoists truly committed to peace and democracy, as the 12-point understanding suggests? Are the Maoists committed to joining the political mainstream? If the parties and Maoists were ever able to topple the monarchy, what then?

The U.S. Ambassador then proceeded to give his own "uncomfortable answer" to these questions — that the Maoists have not changed their policies and have instead managed to draw the parties closer towards their own agenda. The United States, he said, "views the uneasy partnership between the parties and the Maoists as wrongheaded... [W]e believe cooperation along current lines between the Maoists and the parties is fraught with danger — for the political parties themselves, and for the future of the Nepalese people." India must now choose

Mr. Moriarty's remarks pose a particularly acute challenge for India. Since the February 1, 2005, royal takeover, New Delhi has believed that the crisis in Nepal cannot end unless the Maoists are given a "soft landing." Unlike the U.S., which sees the Nepalese Maoists as a detachment of that undifferentiated, amorphous threat known as "international terrorism," the Indian Government has worked on the assumption that a political rather than a military approach to the problem is the only way forward.

Before King Gyanendra's coup and in its immediate aftermath, India believed the principal challenge to Nepal's stability came from the Maoists and that the palace and political parties had to join hands to find a political solution. Of late, however, Indian policymakers have grown increasingly wary of the King himself. They have also warmed to the idea of "mainstreaming" the Maoists by linking them in an alliance with the parliamentary parties. Though India is still officially committed to the `twin pillar theory' — that Nepal needs both multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy — the King's refusal to accept constitutional limits has led an important section of Indian officialdom to conclude that he is his kingdom's biggest problem. New Delhi's tacit support for the 12-point agreement was the product of that conclusion.

At the same time, the Manmohan Singh Government still finds itself at a crossroads as far as the endgame of its Nepal policy is concerned. If Gyanendra's revanchist agenda suggests the monarchy is hell-bent on abolishing itself, the inherent conservatism of the Indian security establishment prevents New Delhi from totally abandoning the King. In his interview to The Hindu , Prachanda deliberately sought to allay some of India's misgivings on four specific counts. He stressed the strategic nature of his party's commitment to multiparty democracy, said Indian encouragement to the democratic forces did not constitute intervention, advised India's Naxalites to consider participating in competitive elections, and suggested China should coordinate its Nepal policy with India. One of the reasons Mr. Moriarty launched his broadside on the 12-point agreement was precisely in order to ensure that the Manmohan Singh Government is not seduced by the Maoists' attempt to mend fences with India.

Though the U.S. Ambassador also had words of criticism for King Gyanendra in his February 15 speech, it is clear that Washington has emerged as the Nepalese monarch's principal international backer. For India, the choice is now a stark one. It can continue to sit on the fence and allow the United States to dictate the contours of yet another counterfeit political settlement in Nepal. Or it can get off the fence and give a fillip to the united struggle of the political parties for a permanent end to the absolutist monarchy via elections to a constituent assembly.

King Gyanendra is already implementing the American plan. "To establish a foundation of trust, the United States believes it is up to the King to initiate [a] dialogue," Ambassador Moriarty had said on February 15. The King made an appeal to this effect three days later, with the judicially ordered winding up of the Royal Commission for Control of Corruption providing a convenient legal opening.

So far the parties have been dismissive but the more resources Washington commits to this process, the greater the likelihood that some combination of leaders will come forward to claim a mandate that is neither King Gyanendra's to give nor theirs to receive. And once a "civilian" and "democratic" government is formed, said Mr. Moriarty, the U.S. "would look eagerly for ways to assist" it by, inter alia, "renewing assistance for the Royal Nepalese Army." Thereby putting Nepal back on the destructive cycle of repression, counter-insurgency, and insurgency.

In response to the American challenge, India must now clearly state its belief that the 12-point agreement between the parties and the Maoists provides a viable road map for the restoration of peace and democracy in Nepal.

It must also call on the parties to be bolder still in their campaign to force the palace to back down. A clear signal — or even a subtle hint — that the monarchy in Nepal is no longer the pillar it used to be and that a constituent assembly is needed to determine the country's political future would give a huge boost to the morale of the democratic forces. Difficult as this decision may be for some in New Delhi to take, the alternative is far worse. For remaining silent in the face of Ambassador Moriarty's provocation would be to cede the political initiative to the U.S. — a mistake that can only have disastrous consequences for both Nepal and India.

 

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 9 February 2006

Part I: From people's war to competitive democracy (The Hindu)
Siddharth Varadarajan

Prachanda (Maoist leader)

As leader of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), Prachanda is arguably the most important political player in the Himalayan kingdom today. In an exclusive face-to-face interview with The Hindu, he discusses his party's road map for the end to monarchy and the creation of a democratic republic in Nepal.

Bespectacled and greying, 52-year-old Prachanda looks and sounds distinctly professorial. His measured tone and quiet demeanour bear no resemblance to the fearsome descriptions propagated by his royalist detractors. When I met up with him at an undisclosed location, he spoke for more than an hour-and-a-half on a wide range of topics concerning the situation in Nepal, its international ramifications, and the theoretical problems confronting the communist movement in the 21st century, which have led the Maoists to embrace multiparty democracy. Excerpts:

In your party plenum last August, you took a momentous decision — to participate in multiparty democracy. If you were going to accept multiparty democracy after 10 years of "people's war," why go about this in a roundabout way?

Prachanda: Three years ago we decided that the key question of the 21st century is how to develop democracy. This meant the negative and positive lessons of the 20th century have to be synthesised for us to move ahead. And we decided we must go in for political competition. Without political competition, a mechanical or metaphysical attitude will be there, without competition we will not be able to go forward. This was a unanimous decision. Last August, we took serious decisions on how practically to build unity with the parliamentary political parties. We don't believe that the peoples' war we initiated was against, or mainly against, multiparty democracy. It was mainly against feudal autocracy, against the feudal structure.

Is this decision a recognition by you of the impossibility of seizing power through armed struggle?

Here there is not only one question. There is a specificity to the political and military balance in today's world. The second thing to be seen is the experience of the 20th century. Third, there is the particular class, political, and power balance in Nepal. It is by taking these three together that we came to our conclusion. We are talking of multiparty democracy within a specific constitutional framework that is anti-feudal and anti-imperialist. That is why armed struggle is also necessary, and unity in action with other political parties against the monarchy is also a necessity. The socio-economic change we are fighting for is against feudalism and imperialism and it is within the context of that struggle that we are talking of multiparty democracy.

If the king says the steps he took last year were wrong and allows free and fair elections under the present Constitution, the Maoists will not take part? Is a new constitutional framework a pre-condition for taking part in elections?

Yes, you can put it that way. If the king says I was wrong, now come on, let us sit across the table, and then he talks of a free and fair election to a constitutional assembly, we will be ready. Our bottom line is the election of a constitutional assembly, that too under international supervision, either by the United Nations or some other international mediation acceptable to all. Under those circumstances, we will go in for elections and accept whatever the peoples' verdict is. But if the king says make an interim government and hold elections, we will not come forward.

Is your alliance with the parties tactical rather than strategic? When the monarchy is weakened or defeated, might you turn against them?

It is not like this. Our decision on multiparty democracy is a strategically, theoretically developed position, that in a communist state, democracy is a necessity. We are telling the parties that we should end not only the autocratic monarchy but monarchy itself. After that, in the multiparty democracy which comes — interim government, constitutional assembly and democratic republic — we are ready to have peaceful competition with you all. Of course, people still have a doubt about us because we have an army. And they ask whether we will abandon our arms after the constitutional assembly. We have said we are ready to reorganise our army and we are ready to make a new Nepal army also. We are talking of a democratic republic and our understanding with the parties is that the way to realise this is the constituent assembly. At that time, any other party would be free to call for a ceremonial monarchy, some may be for constitutional monarchy — such a thing is possible with the seven parties.

But whatever the outcome, you are ready to accept it?

We are. This we are saying in clear-cut language.

Your recent ceasefire did a lot to improve the image of the Maoists, which had been damaged by incidents like the Madi bus blast. What was the logic behind that ceasefire and when might you declare another one?

We called our ceasefire basing ourselves on the whole political situation because on our side too some mistakes were increasing, from below, in the implementation of our policy and plan. Mistakes were happening such as the Madi bomb blast. Our relationship was getting worse with the middle class. We were saying things from the top but still this was not being implemented. So we wanted the middle classes to be with us, and put out our political message to the broad masses in a new way. We also wanted to tell the international community that Gyanendra is not a monarch, these are autocratic elements more keen on bloodshed than anybody else. For these reasons we decided to go for a ceasefire. As for the specific timing, the U.N. General Assembly was going to be held and the so-called king was going to go there and say he was for peace and democracy. We thought a ceasefire is one way politically to hit him. We also wanted to tell the international community we were different from the way we were being projected. When we ended the ceasefire, we clearly stated that if a forward-looking atmosphere for a political solution emerges, we can again announce a ceasefire. But now, that situation does not obtain.

Are you prepared to join together with the parliamentary parties, with Mr. Koirala and Madhav Nepal, and go and talk face-to-face with the king to discuss the future of Nepal?

If there is unanimous understanding with the parties that we should talk to the king, we will go. We are not prepared to meet the king alone, and we are requesting the parties that they also not go alone. Nothing will come of it. Only if we act collectively can we achieve anything.

Rather than the Maoists calling a seven-day bandh against the municipal elections, wouldn't it have been better for you and the parties to have given a joint call for boycott?

I agree. When the 12-point agreement was reached with the parties last year, there was a second understanding that within a week or two we would issue a joint statement appealing to the masses to boycott elections and stage mass demonstrations. But that has not proved possible.

Why?

Because the parties' leadership is a little hesitant. They are perhaps a little afraid that if they join with the Maoists and issue a joint statement for boycott, there could be greater repression on them.

Some feel the Maoists' military actions are reducing the political space for the parliamentary parties. For example, a few days before their big demonstration in Kathmandu, you attacked a police station in Thankot and the king imposed curfew. Can't you act in a way that increases your political space but does not squeeze the parties?

I agree a way has to be found. This is a serious and complicated question. When the 12-point agreement was reached, there was need for continuous interaction between us and them. Only then could we establish some synchronicity between their movement and ours. This did not happen. Despite this, we told the parties that whether we stage actions or not, the king is going to move against you. Even if we had done nothing in Thankot, curfew would have been imposed anyway.

Does the king control the Royal Nepal Army or does it control the King?

This is a very interesting question. Right now, in fact, this is precisely what we are discussing within our party and outside. Until now, it seemed the balance was 50-50. Sometimes the RNA controls the king, and sometimes the king controls the RNA. But it seems as if we are now going towards a situation where the RNA is in the driving seat. This seems to be the emerging situation but we cannot say this with facts. One thing is clear. Gyanendra became king after the royal massacre — and it is clear that without the RNA, that massacre could never have happened. So there is no question of his going beyond the script dictated by the RNA.

What kind of guarantees can you give in the run-up to any constitutional assembly election that your People's Liberation Army will not place obstacles in the way of the parties?

We understand the parties have reservations about us and our army. So we made a proposal to them that you rehabilitate parliament, we will support you. A two-thirds majority of MPs is with the Nepali Congress, UML, and smaller parties. Call a meeting and declare that parliament has been reinstated and that what Gyanendra is doing is illegitimate. Do this and then set up a multiparty government with the main aim of elections for a constitutional assembly. In this restoration of parliament, the king would be illegal, and we will come for negotiations with your leadership. Under your leadership, we will be in the interim government. As for the RNA, you should appeal to the democratic elements within it by saying the king has violated the constitution, you come over to this side, this is the legal government and it is your responsibility to support it. And then the king should be given an ultimatum of a week or two to agree to elections for a constitutional assembly. If he doesn't agree, we would then abolish the monarchy. And we would tell the international community this is the legitimate government. Please stop recognising or supporting him.

Under such a situation, the RNA's democratic elements will be there, and so will the PLA, so we will organise the army as a new Nepal army. At that point, the problem will not be our weapons. The problem of arms and weapons is with the RNA, which for 250 years has been loyal to the feudal lords. Our army has only been around for 10 years. This is not a problem. If there is a political solution, we are prepared to change that too. This is the first proposal that we have put forward. We will abolish the monarchy, there will be an insurrection, and then we will have the peaceful reorganisation of the army.

What you are proposing is that the parliamentary parties stage a revolution!

This is one way to deal with this problem and we are seriously putting it forward. It is revolutionary, it is viable, it is possible. This is our first proposal but you are right, the parties are not ready for this. The second way is also what we have been discussing, that the U.N. or some other credible body supervises things. The RNA will be in the barracks and the PLA will also be under supervision. Both armies and arms will be under international supervision and will not enter the fray. Then there will be elections for a constitutional assembly. Our army will not interfere in the process.

What form will this international supervision take? Will it include foreign troops?

No troops. There can be a militia or police, which we create only for election purposes.

Who will be part of this militia?

We have not gone into such details — perhaps cadres of the different parties, but all without firearms, to manage security for the elections. So there will be elections for the assembly and whatever verdict comes, it is on that basis that the army has to be reorganised. If the republic result comes, then the RNA's generals and commanders will have to go and the interim government would appoint as generals officers who are loyal to democratic values. If a constitutional monarchy wins, then there is the danger that the old generals will remain. So my point is that the army can be changed.

But you concede there is a history, which is why the parties are suspicious...

Yes there is, but we are talking about this too. There have been attacks by us on them, and we had seized property. Whatever had been taken from the Congress leadership has been returned — land and property — UML leadership too. So we are trying to build an understanding. If the parties' leaders say that in the past the Maoists attacked us, then we can also say that the RNA army was deployed against us when you were in government and so many of our comrades were killed.

Whatever we may have done, the other side did so much more and this also has to be accounted for. But if we start talking like this, we will not be able to solve the major problem. If we have to make a breakthrough, then we should both review our history. We have to review our mistakes but you have to as well, because we have a common enemy — feudal aristocracy. We have to defeat this enemy and in consonance with democratic values we have to reorganise the army and state.

Part II: "Multiparty democracy in Nepal will be message to Indian Naxalites"

In the second and final part of this exclusive interview withThe Hindu, Maoist leader Prachanda provides his evaluation of the role of India, China, and the United States in the struggle for democracy in Nepal. And he has words of advice for the Maoists in India: it is time you started thinking about multiparty competitive democracy as well.

I want to ask you about the 2001 royal palace massacre. I was in Kathmandu to cover the story. I was initially suspicious of the Dipendra theory but later, I spoke to close relatives of those who died — who spoke to survivors like Princess Ketaki Chester who cannot really be considered part of monarchical factions with a particular agenda. And they all said it was Dipendra who committed the crime.

Prachanda: This is impossible. Of course, the [Gyanendra] clique has managed to establish the story amongst its own circles, among people who may be neutral as you say. They have established it in their class but that is not the reality. You know how different stories were put out immediately, that the guns went off automatically, then another story was made. There was even an effort to suggest Maoists had made a surprise attack. In the end, they pinned it on Dipendra. So the question arises, if it was so clear-cut, why didn't this story come out in the beginning? But my main logic is not this. If you look at the whole history of [crown prince] Paras — he was there at the time; second, the role of Gyanendra in the 1990 movement. He had a big role then — he wanted to shoot down 2,000 people in Kathmandu and control the movement through force, he was a die-hard element. And what kind of [person] Paras is — this is also known. For more than a month, the massacre was planned and Gyanendra based himself outside. So I don't think for even a moment it was Dipendra. And in any case, the Nepali people simply refuse to believe this story

How do you see the role of India today? Last year, when the king seized power, India took a tough stand against him that surprised many. It is also significant that the Indian Government does not seem to regard the Nepal Maoists as illegitimate in the way that the king and the U.S. regard them.

In the past, India's policy was one of total alignment with the king. Last year, after February 1, ever since the situation changed in a big way, the role of the Indian authorities strikes us as positive. There is now a tough stand against autocracy. Still, the two-pillar theory [that Nepal's stability rests equally on constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy] persists and the Indian authorities have not officially abandoned it. They are right to support the democratic movement, but sticking to the two-pillar theory causes confusion...

But if India abandons it, wouldn't the king accuse the Indians of interfering in Nepal's affairs, and then he will accuse the Maoists of being agents of India...

We don't think such a thing is possible. During the 1990 movement, when Rajiv Gandhi imposed a blockade on Nepal, the Nepali people did not oppose the blockade because it was in the context of the blockade that the democratic movement picked up speed and advanced very fast. If India is in favour of the democratic movement and a forward-looking political solution, then it will not be considered intervention. But if India supports regressive forces, this would be called intervention. Some political leaders came from India recently to show solidarity with the movement. Gyanendra tried illegally to detain them at the airport, calling it intervention. But more than 99 per cent of Nepali people did not regard that as intervention. Of course, when Hindu fundamentalists like this [VHP leader Ashok] Singhal come to Nepal, the king welcomes them. When they crown him `King of the Hindus,' he doesn't call it interference! So the anger of the Nepalese people has grown against the king, not India.

If you were to meet Manmohan Singh, what would you ask him to do?

First, change this two-pillar theory. The Nepali people are trying to end the monarchy and you should end your relationship with it. Second, release all our comrades who are in prison in India. We are fighting for genuine multiparty democracy but they are imprisoned there, in Patna, Siliguri, Chennai. If you release them all, a message will go out. And if you feel the Naxalite movement in India is a problem for you, we feel we are trying to deal with the problems in Nepal in a new way, so if you release our comrades and we are successful in establishing multiparty democracy in Nepal, this will be a very big message for the Naxalite movement in India. In other words, the ground will be readied for them to think in a new political way. Words are not enough, we need to validate what we are saying by establishing that democracy. Third, once a democratic republic is established in Nepal, then the historical doubts that have existed in the relations between Nepal and India can be ended once and for all. So for all these reasons, you should strongly support the movement for democracy.

In many ways, the U.S. has emerged as the king's strongest backer. How do you evaluate Washington's role?

The U.S. role from the beginning has been negative and they are still trying to effect a compromise between the monarch and the political parties against the Maoists. Despite the fact that we are talking of pushing multiparty democracy, the U.S. has decided our movement and alliance has to be crushed.

What is the American interest in being soft on the king?

It is not that they are afraid of what might happen in Nepal. Rather, their strategy is against the Indian and Chinese people and also, I think, against the Indian and Chinese authorities. The U.S. has a grand strategy, and Bush is talking of China and India as big economic powers and even as threats. Perhaps they see Nepal as a country that is between these two countries and believe that if the situation here does not give rise to forces which are in step with the U.S., then there could be a problem. So the U.S. is looking at Nepal from the strategic point of view. It is not that they have any economic interest here. Political control is the key, so they want to strengthen the king.

What about the attitude of China? Some people in India argue that if India continues to take a tough stand against the king, he will turn to China for help and Beijing will benefit strategically at New Delhi's expense?

Earlier, we had a doubt that perhaps China might be behind the king, that China would try and take advantage. But then we analysed the situation and came to the conclusion that China would not play this role. China's relations with India are improving and China will not want to jeopardise such a big interest by backing the Nepal king. And in the end, I think our analysis has been proved correct. Recently, when Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran went to Beijing, he had talks, and a few days later, for the first time, the Chinese authorities issued a statement saying they are worried about the situation inside Nepal and that it needs a careful resolution. Until then, Beijing had always maintained that what was happening inside Nepal was an internal problem.

China has no interest in antagonising India to build a relationship with the king. This is our analysis. We are glad with the new situation that is emerging after Shyam Saran went to China. If China and India do not work together, there will be a big problem not only for now but the future. So they need to have an understanding in favour of democracy, in favour of the people of Nepal. Our movement is going forward and I think in two or three months, if the struggle continues, there is a real chance of ending the kingship once and for all and making a democratic republic in Nepal. This is the best outcome for China and India and everyone else. Of course, the U.S. does not want this. They want to maintain the monarchy at all costs.

To what extent do you think the logic of your line on multiparty democracy applies also to the Maoist movements in India?

We believe it applies to them too. We want to debate this. They have to understand this and go down this route. Both on the question of leadership and on multiparty democracy, or rather multiparty competition I believe those who call themselves revolutionaries in India need to think about these issues. And there is a need to go in the direction of that practice. We wish to debate with them on this. If revolutionaries are not going to look at the need for ideological development, they will not go anywhere.

Indian police agencies say you are providing weapons and training to the Indian Maoists but here you are saying they should go in for multiparty competition...

There is no question of us giving anything. They blame us for Madhubani, Jehanabad, but we have no relationship of this kind with them.

 

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 24 january 2006

Nepal King shows true colours (The Hindu)

By arresting prominent politicians from democratic parties and bringing in other restrictions on political activity through a sudden countrywide emergency, King Gyanendra of Nepal has acted true to type. Only the naοve could have believed his promises to restore democracy. His desire to expand his powers after ascending the throne as a constitutional monarch culminated in the February 2005 coup, in which he dismissed the Sher Bahadur Deuba Government and assumed executive powers. The autocratic monarch then made a show of taking steps to restore democracy, including a decision to hold municipal elections. Few were fooled. A democratic seven-party alliance rightly questioned the legitimacy of a municipal election called by an unconstitutional ruler. Demanding that the King restore democracy first, they announced a boycott of the February 8 elections. The mass arrests and restrictions on political activities, including protest marches and demonstrations, a day before the parties were to hold a rally in Kathmandu against the elections, provide clinching evidence that there is not one democratic bone in King Gyanendra. Following an outpouring of protest, the royalist government released three of the arrested leaders, notably Girija Prasad Koirala of the Nepali Congress. If the King thought that by selectively freeing some leaders he could create a rift in the democratic alliance, a firm statement from the NC that it would not play to the monarch's tune has banished that hope.

Still courtiers are putting up an elaborate defence of the King's actions. Foreign Minister Ramesh Nath Pandey has spoken of a "road map to peace, stability and democracy" that is "concrete and realisable." The monarchy is also using the resumption of attacks by Maoist insurgents, who called off a unilateral ceasefire three months after announcing it, as an excuse for the emergency. The regime says the crackdown was necessary to prevent Maoists from infiltrating the Nepal capital during the protest rally. But then the Maoists have justified their return to violence on the ground that the King refused to respond to their ceasefire. It does appear that King Gyanendra let the truce die because he preferred the Maoists to revert to attack mode. The political parties would then reconsider aligning with the Maoists, and this situation might enable him to consolidate absolutist powers under the banner of national security with the help of the Royal Nepal Army. India, which continued to supply arms to Nepal even after the King usurped power last year (it has since stopped the supply) must not allow itself to be taken in again. Only a multi-party parliamentary democracy can ensure peace and stability in Nepal, not a dictatorial and reactionary monarch with street cunning. India cannot stress this enough.

 

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