27 March 2007

Tigers launch first air strike
B. Muralidhar Reddy

COLOMBO: In the first-ever aerial bombing operation, Tamil Tigers in the early hours of Monday targeted the main military base of the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) on the outskirts of the capital, killing three Air Force personnel and injuring 16 others.

The operation, which came amid fierce fighting between the Army and the Tigers in the north and east in which the LTTE suffered a blow, has baffled military and political observers here.

Went unchallenged

A highly embarrassed Mahinda Rajapaksa Government ordered two separate investigations into the security lapses which enabled the nascent Tiger "Air Force" wing to sneak all the way from the jungles of Vanni right into the middle of the only international airport in the country and return without being challenged. The aircraft would have travelled at least 600 km to and from the `base' and would have been in the air for nearly two hours.

As per the details available, a light wing aircraft manned by the Tiger cadres attacked the SLAF base with two bombs. However, Tigers claimed that "two attack aircraft" were engaged in the mission. The Government sought to play down the strike. It said a major disaster was averted and the international airport in the vicinity was unaffected.

The military said "the raid was carried out by a light wing aircraft similar to hand gliders which could be assembled with minimum labour."

Information Minister Anura Priyadarshana Yapa told a news conference here that the "failed mission" of the Tigers was a "conspiracy" aimed at the MIG 27 aircraft assisting the armed forces in the north and east. The Minister claimed that the mission was unsuccessful due to the "timely appropriate action" of the Air Force.

He said a five-member committee, headed by the Chief of the Staff of the Air Force Air Vice Marshal P.B. Premachandra, started investigating the incident.

LTTE claim

The LTTE said two attack aircraft carried out "bombing raids" at the SLAF airbase at Katunayake at 0045 hours and returned safely to Vanni.

Military spokesperson of the LTTE Irasaiah Ilanthiraiyan told TamilNet that the targets were the SLAF's Kfir and MiG-27 hangars.

"The attack is not only pre-emptive but also to safeguard our people from indiscriminate bombing by the SLAF."


Source: The Hindu

 4 December 2006

Peace in Sri Lanka — putting the pieces together
Ranil Wickremesinghe

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS were held on November 17, 2005. Mahinda Rajapaksa, the People's Freedom Alliance candidate, was elected in the backdrop of an enforced boycott of the elections in the North-East enforced by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The vast majority of Tamils in the North-East were supportive of the United National Party and this enforced boycott was aimed at it. The UPFA electoral platform included amending the Ceasefire Agreement, and a rejection of the federal system. These were demands made by the JVP claiming that (a) the Ceasefire Agreement was a sell out; and (b) a federal system would lead to a separate state.

After the elections, the LTTE started an Intifada type uprising in Jaffna, protesting that the Government was going back on its undertakings. Karuna's paramilitary group re-commenced the killing of LTTE supporters. In retaliation, the LTTE started laying claymore mines and a number of military vehicles were blown up, resulting in a large numbers of deaths.

On December 24, Joseph Pararajasingham, a Tamil National Alliance MP who supported the LTTE, was killed while praying at his Church in Batticaloa. The TNA and the LTTE alleged that the security forces were involved in the killing. Despite the escalation of violence, the Norwegian Government was able to arrange for talks between the Government and the LTTE in Geneva. The talks were limited to the implementation of the ceasefire.

The ceasefire talks between the two parties were held in Geneva on February 22-23, 2006. Both parties committed themselves to uphold the Ceasefire Agreement. They agreed as follows: "The LTTE is committed to taking all necessary measures to ensure that there will be no acts of violence against the security forces and police. The Government of Sri Lanka is committed to taking all necessary measures in accordance with the Ceasefire Agreement to ensure that no armed group or person other than the security forces will carry arms or conduct armed operations."

The second round of this phase of talks was set for April 19-21, 2006. Soon after the [first round] talks, the LTTE stated that the Government of Sri Lanka should disarm the Tamil paramilitary groups before the second round of ceasefire talks. The Government of Sri Lanka took no action to disarm the paramilitary, arguing that the Tamil paramilitary forces were operating outside the areas controlled by the Army.

As a result, violence erupted again in March. It escalated after the killing of a prominent leader of the TNA inside the high security zone in Trincomalee. The second round of talks, set for April 2006, was postponed. Since then, seven months of escalating violence have brought a suicide bomb attack on the Army Commander; the explosion of a land mine in Kebettigollawa, resulting in the death of nearly 60 passengers travelling in a bus; sea battles between the Navy and the Sea Tigers; the abduction and killing of Tamil civilians in Colombo District; air strikes within the areas controlled by the LTTE, including the Mullaitivu Hospital; artillery shelling of the Vaharai refugee camp; the Army clearing the LTTE from parts of Trincomalee District; the killing of another very popular TNA Member of Parliament; and the killing of security forces personnel, LTTE members, and Karuna group members.

The Government closed the A9 route in August 2006. Under the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement, both parties had agreed to open the A9 route to facilitate the normal transportation of goods and persons; and provision was made for the safety of sea transport between Trincomalee and Jaffna. However, the LTTE has now stated that it cannot assure safe passage for ships passing close to LTTE-controlled areas.

The Co-Chairs have stated that the present situation gives rise to grave concern as the rising level of violence has led to a significant loss of life, widespread human rights violations, and systematic ceasefire violations by both sides. Furthermore, an atmosphere of fear prevails in the land owing to disappearances, killings, and the deliberate targeting of civilians.

Consequently, India and the Co-Chairs have urged the [Sri Lankan] Government to put forward a set of proposals aimed at finding a political solution to the North-East conflict. Thereafter, at the end of August, President Rajapaksa wrote to the UNP and requested our party's assistance to arrive at a political solution to the North-East conflict. Despite the divisive nature of Sri Lankan politics and the climate of acrimony between the party cadres, we responded positively. Talks took place between the two political parties. As a result, on October 23, 2006, the United National Party and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party signed a Memorandum of Understanding to cooperate on key issues vital for the nation's well being.

To me, the success of the recent MOU depends on the ability of both sides and more so between the two of us — the President and myself — to establish a working relationship. This is easier said than done in politics. In a multi-party system where there are two leading parties, the main contenders compete for power, either by themselves or as coalitions. It is very rarely that they work together. Nevertheless, in some countries the main parties have worked together in times of war — usually through coalition governments.

Yet this MOU is not one to form a coalition government. It is an understanding to collaborate — one party being the government and the other party being the main opposition — to prepare a political solution to the North-East conflict.

Elements of the MOU

Under the MOU, a viable resolution of the ethnic issue will be based on the following elements: (i) The eventual solution to the ethnic issue has to be political in character. The cornerstone of the political solution is power-sharing within the country on a basis acceptable to the Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim communities. (ii) Emphasis will be placed on the principle that power sharing is for the benefit — not of any particular group or party but for the people at large. (iii) The basic assumption underlying an equitable framework for power-sharing is that the central government would be invested with all powers, functions, and responsibilities essential for the effective conduct of national policy, while other matters will fall within the purview of regional administrations. (iv) Priority will be given to prompt and effective action to rehabilitate all persons who have been displaced, or whose lives have been disrupted.

Returning to the peace process, under the Indo-Lanka Agreement [of July 29, 1987] the Northern and Eastern Provinces were combined as one administrative unit. President J.R. Jayewardene issued the relevant gazette notifications under the Provincial Council Act, 1987 merging the two provinces and establishing a Provincial Council. However, on October 16, 2006 this year, the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka held that President Jayawardene did not have the authority to issue such gazette notifications, as the LTTE had not surrendered all the arms in accordance with that law. The court further stated that the Parliament could, by legislation, merge the two provinces. The Government is yet to announce its position on the merger of the North and East. This has further complicated matters. And a second round of talks between the Government and the LTTE, held in Geneva on October 28-29, 2006, ended inconclusively.

The Ceasefire Agreement is the main achievement of the 2001 peace initiative. It enabled the commencement of a substantive dialogue through a series of well-structured meetings to discuss both confidence-building measures and a negotiated political solution. The agreements arrived at during the six rounds of peace talks, the statement by the Government of Sri Lanka, and the Oslo and Tokyo Declarations established the parameters of a political solution.

Nevertheless, it has become necessary to review the monitoring mechanism first established under the Ceasefire Agreement. At that time, no one foresaw the present escalation of violence. It has become necessary to make the Monitoring Mission more effective. However, a monitoring mission will succeed only if both parties are committed to upholding the Ceasefire Agreement. While the Ceasefire Agreement still stands, it is observed in the breach by both parties. Neither party is willing to formally abrogate the Agreement.

Speaking at the "Heroes' Day" Commemoration on November 27, 2006, the LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabakaran, accused the Government of making the Ceasefire Agreement defunct by following what he calls "a war and peace approach." He stated that the LTTE has "no other option but an independent state for the people of Tamil Eelam." Nonetheless, he has not formerly declared a separate state. Neither has he given notice of termination to the Norwegian Government in accordance with the Ceasefire Agreement. However, he has announced that the LTTE is not prepared to "walk along the same futile path" and will re-commence "the freedom struggle."

It is clear then that the LTTE is ready to intensify the war. Its objective is a decisive military victory that will give it a significant advantage at the negotiating table when peace talks resume. The Government has responded by announcing its readiness for war. But no one can control the outcome of escalating violence. Therefore the Co-Chairs and India must determine how to respond to this urgent situation. Otherwise, it will be difficult to get the parties back to negotiations.

In the meeting of June 2004, the Co-Chairs called for a rapid resumption of peace negotiations by the parties. Since then the Co-Chairs have, time and again, taken the initiative to bring the two parties together — going beyond the initial mandate of reviewing the progress in the peace process. Therefore, the role of the Co-Chairs has changed from reviewing progress to holding the peace process together.

Since 1983, India has been helping successive governments of Sri Lanka in their attempt to resolve the North-East conflict. Sri Lanka consulted India before signing the Ceasefire Agreement and, thereafter, has consulted India on many aspects of the peace process. The Government of India also provided inputs pertaining to the technical aspects of the devolution of power. India also has a close dialogue with the Norwegian Government facilitator and the other Co-Chairs. Recently, the Co-Chairs acknowledged that India was working hand-in-hand with them to promote peace in Sri Lanka. Moreover, India has also been instrumental in ensuring that the peace process was continued by the Government of Sri Lanka.

However, both India and the Co-Chairs have pointed out that "the responsibility to make peace lies with the Government and the LTTE. We can be of support to them." On November 21, 2006, the Co-Chairs issued a Joint Statement calling on both the Government and the LTTE to seize the historic opportunity created by the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement to resolve the country's conflict peacefully, and to implement the agreement fully, including the re-opening of the A9 highway.

Co-chairs' stand

Furthermore, the Co-Chairs have urged both parties to commit themselves to a structured and sustained process for further negotiations — without preconditions — once a proposal is available as indicated by the Government and welcomed by the LTTE. The Co-Chairs have also emphasised that (i) the agreement between the SLFP and the UNP should lead to a credible power-sharing proposal that can help form the basis for a viable negotiated settlement between the parties (to the Ceasefire Agreement); and (ii) the specific arrangements for the North and East should not be disturbed as they are fundamental to continuing the dialogue to achieve an agreement.

The future of a long-term peace hinges on these two agreements — the Ceasefire Agreement and the MOU. The implementation of the provisions of the MOU will result in formulating a proposal for a political solution, which will form the base for discussion between the Government and the LTTE. This proposal will re-activate the Ceasefire Agreement leading to simultaneous negotiations on all three tracks of the peace process — the ceasefire, humanitarian relief, and political discussions. The emphasis has now shifted to the MOU as a means of kick-starting the peace process — by putting forward a political solution. This is a radical departure from the step-by-step approach based on the Ceasefire Agreement advocated by us in 2002.

A lot of water has flowed under the bridge in the last five years. The LTTE itself has gained experience in negotiations and acquired knowledge on different systems of government. Time is of the essence, and it is important that the peace process is finalised with the least delay. The Nepalese peace process, which started last year, has already been concluded and the parties have signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Under this approach, the onus is thrown on the two main political parties — the UNP and the SLFP. It is a challenge we must take up. If we fail, the peace process will fail. Therefore, it is imperative that the Committee of Experts (appointed by this Government) conclude their tasks by making their recommendations on the political solution. Their Report should be made available to the All Party Conference by the first week of December. Then, our two parties, the UNP and the SLFP, can commence bilateral discussions based on this Report. If we build on the parameters established by the MOU, the Tokyo Declaration, the six rounds of peace talks, and draw on the Indian model — the final result will be a credible power-sharing proposal that will form the basis for a viable negotiated settlement.

We do not require a UNP solution, an SLFP solution, an LTTE solution, or a JVP solution. We require a Sri Lankan settlement acceptable to all the communities. The other political parties must support our two parties to achieve these objectives.

The Ceasefire Agreement and the peace process are sufficiently flexible to adapt to changing circumstances. What is required is the will to make it work. That is provided by the MOU. The fate of the nation depends on us. We cannot and should not fail the people of Sri Lanka.

(Ranil Wickremesinghe, UNP leader, former Prime Minister, and Leader of the Opposition in the Sri Lankan Parliament, is the architect of the 2002 ceasefire. This article is excerpted from a lecture he gave at the Indian Institute of Management, Indore on December 1, 2006.)
Source: The Hindu

 17 June 2006

From Anuradhapura to Anuradhapura

On May 14, 1985, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam carried out a massacre in Anuradhapura, gunning down 146 civilians as they prayed at a Buddhist shrine. That bestial act was a turning point in the conflict in Sri Lanka. It told the world that in the lexicon of the LTTE's `liberation' ideology, there is no place for humane conduct. Almost to the day 21 years later, as if to mark the anniversary of that attack, the LTTE has carried out another horrific massacre in Anuradhapura. Inevitably, there will be those who argue that it was the European Union ban that drove the LTTE to carry out this claymore mine attack on a bus carrying innocent men, women, and children. They must pause to think that had V. Prabakaran's organisation been a sincere partner in the attempt to find a negotiated, peaceful solution to the ethnic conflict, its effort would have been to tell the world after the European ban how wrong and misled this group of 25 countries was in judging its character; it would have gone out of its way to project itself as a reasonable organisation; it would have negotiated with maturity at Oslo and agreed to revive the stalled second round of talks at Geneva. But instead of Geneva 2, the LTTE served up Anuradhapura 2. That should be enough to banish the last lingering doubts about the wisdom of the EU ban.

In the two decades that separate the two massacres, the LTTE has shown on countless occasions that it revels in violence and terrorism as "political strategy," wearing this proudly as a badge of honour. It has directed violence against Tamils and Muslims to silence those who oppose it in these communities and to establish decisively its hegemony over them. Against the Sinhalese, the Tigers use violence again and again, hoping to provoke the majority community into unleashing an orgy of revenge attacks against the minority Tamils. The LTTE awaits such an opportunity to justify its own existence and Pol Potist methods. But this is not 1983. It may remain where it was then, but the Sri Lankan state has matured almost beyond recognition to realise that it has to be accountable to all its citizens, irrespective of ethnicity or religion. There was an unfortunate lowering of guard by the Government in Trincomalee a few weeks ago, when the LTTE deliberately stoked up anti-Tamil sentiment in the Sinhala community. But President Mahinda Rajapakse was alert enough to prevent the situation from spinning out of control. After the attack on the bus, the Sri Lankan Government carried out retaliatory strikes on LTTE positions in the North-East, just as it did following a suicide bomber's attempt to kill the Army chief. Whether a war can be averted at this stage is uncertain. But under no circumstance must the Rajapakse Government get provoked into a conflict in which the worst sufferers will be the people of Sri Lanka. India and the world must express their firm solidarity with Sri Lanka during this time of troubles.
Source: The Hindu

 27 May 2006

Choices before the LTTE

It is entirely in keeping with the character of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam that, faced with the real prospect of a ban by the European Union, it has threatened to take "a hard-line individualist path." For much of the period since the ceasefire agreement was signed in February 2002, the extremist organisation's negotiating stance has been: "negotiate with us on our terms, or else... " Apprehension about the "or else" led the Sri Lankan Government and the international community to adopt a policy of toleration bordering on appeasement. With `mediator' Norway pushing the limits of tolerance, barbarous acts of terrorism and human rights violations were overlooked for the sake of keeping the peace. But where did all this lead? The LTTE's refusal to attend peace talks after a few rounds; its assassination of political enemies and other acts of terrorism; its continuing abuse of children; and its over-the-top demands for setting up an interim self-governing authority that would function virtually as a separate state, and for having its sea wing acknowledged as a `navy' - these were enough to tire all but die-hard champions of Tigerism. The European Union's decision, taken in the wake of the assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar in October 2005, not to receive official LTTE delegations was the first concrete indication that the most permissive section of the international community no longer wanted to carry a flag for the group. In recent weeks, the LTTE's ceasefire violations, renewed claim of sovereignty over the waters, air space, and territory of North-East Sri Lanka, and warning to international ceasefire monitors to stay off Sri Lanka Navy vessels in the North-East have eroded tolerance. Europe is now a heartbeat away from outlawing the LTTE, with the European Parliament resolution calling for a freeze of LTTE assets in member countries.

Is the LTTE's threat just bluff? It is doubtful that the terrorist organisation, although armed to the teeth, retains the politico-military capacity for a sustained military engagement with the Sri Lankan state. For one thing, the Karuna revolt has exposed its vulnerability in eastern Sri Lanka. For another, the Sri Lankan Government has shown the necessary firmness and resoluteness in punishing Tigerism. But what has turned strategically against the LTTE is the international situation. If it is to get out of this hole, it needs to demonstrate a sincerity and commitment to the peace process that will be totally out of character. At the same time, the Sri Lankan Government must refrain from any triumphalism that might provide encouragement to those driving a hard-line Sinhala nationalist agenda. Regardless of how the LTTE behaves, President Mahinda Rajapakse - who has demonstrated sturdy realism in a difficult situation - must lead from the front in crafting a just political settlement based on devolution of power within the framework of keeping Sri Lanka as one country.
Source: The Hindu

 19 May 2006

A war of diminishing returns

R. Hariharan
The LTTE's fight now stands reduced to a turf war to establish its rights over the northeast. Its continued escalation of violence means increased loss of international sympathy for Sri Lankan Tamils.

ON MAY 11, 2006, on the eve of Vesak day (Buddha Purnima), the biggest festival day of the nation, Sri Lanka escaped a terrible ethnic flare up. Only the day before, a Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) troopship mv Pearl Cruise, carrying 710 military men and moving in a naval convoy off Point Pedro on the Jaffna coast, escaped destruction when boats of the Sea Tigers, the naval arm of the LTTE, surrounded it. The LTTE could have sunk the ship, destining all the Sri Lanka Armed Forces (SLAF) men to a watery grave. Luckily for them and Sri Lanka, the ship had on board a monitor from the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) and an Indian Coast Guard ship appeared on the horizon. Perhaps these complications and another naval engagement at sea a little distance away discouraged the Sea Tigers from going ahead with their attack. However, in the other engagement the Sea Tigers sank an SLN fast attack craft. Its crew of 17 sailors are reported missing. Another fast attack craft damaged in the operations reportedly sank later. The Sri Lanka Navy responded swiftly with guns blazing both from sea and air. They claim to have sunk five LTTE boats, sending an unknown number of LTTE cadres to their death. The Sri Lanka Air Force used this window of opportunity to carry out air strikes on targets in the Iranamadu area (Iranamadu airfield area houses LTTE's fledgling air arm, the Air Tigers).

Of course, Sea Tiger operations are nothing new. During this year, they had three successful operations against the Navy and two unsuccessful ones. But qualitatively, their attack on mv Pearl Cruiser is different because it was pre-meditated. The LTTE had earlier warned the SLMM not to send its Scandinavian monitors in the SLN craft - and that is a dangerous trend if the peace process is to be revived. The Sri Lankan Government had been careful in not carrying out retaliatory military attacks on the LTTE till the Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, narrowly survived a LTTE suicide bomber's attempt to kill him on April 25, 2006, though it killed 11 others. But the attack on Gen. Fonseka, a watershed event, has given the Sri Lankan Government a legitimate reason to take offensive action as part of "defensive measures." Immediately after the attack on their chief, the armed forces bombarded LTTE positions in coastal areas of Muthur East in Trincomalee from the air, land, and sea. It is significant that Karuna launched his offensive against LTTE positions in the same area a few days earlier. While LTTE casualties are not known, the Tamil population bore the brunt of the attack. A few thousand Tamils living in the area fled as refugees. In the North, the SLAF imposed a curfew in Jaffna to move troops to the Nagarkovil salient on the northeast.

Thus the singular achievement of the LTTE's attack on the SLAF Chief was giving legitimacy to the Government to use retaliatory force even as the ceasefire rested on its last legs. Added to this, the attack on the Navy troopship had two other negative fallouts for the LTTE. After the attack on mv Pearl Cruiser, the SLMM, while strongly condemning the LTTE's act as "a gross violation of the ceasefire," gave a firm ruling on two counts: (1) the sea surrounding Sri Lanka is a Government Controlled Area in line with international law; and (2) the LTTE, as a non-state actor, cannot rule open sea waters or airspace. The LTTE has, therefore, no rights at sea. This is the first time the SLMM has come out categorically on the twin issues of the LTTE's rights to air and sea spaces of areas under its control as well as its status as a non-state actor. As expected, the LTTE political wing head, S.P. Tamilselvan, registered his strong objection to both the rulings. He also claimed that the LTTE enjoyed `sovereignty' over land, sea, and air in parts of the `Tamil Homeland' it had seized by force of arms.

During the four years of the ceasefire, the LTTE had used the semantic ambiguity of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) regarding its rights on sea to claim sovereignty over the seas in the northeast. Clause 1.3 of the CFA permits the SLAF "to perform their legitimate task of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka without engaging in offensive operations against the LTTE." As this clause impinged on the primary role of the Sri Lanka Navy, the issue of LTTE rights on sea came to the fore in March and June 2003, barely a year after the signing of the CFA, when the Navy with the support of the Indian Navy sank two LTTE ships off the northeast coast of Sri Lanka. The Sri Lanka Navy had targeted the two LTTE vessels believed to be bringing in military hardware. At that time, the peace talks between the Government and the LTTE were in progress and both sides were on talking terms. They asked the SLMM to work out modalities to prevent such clashes at sea. The SLMM, then headed by Norway, came out with a set of proposals to carve out separate areas for the Sea Tigers, for training and live firing. It also suggested recognition of Sea Tigers as a `de facto naval unit.' No detection or inspection of Sea Tigers vessels was to be permitted for the Navy in the designated areas without the presence of SLMM monitors. The ruling raised a lot of eyebrows in Sri Lanka as well as India because it directly interfered with the sovereignty of a legally constituted nation. This ruling also gave licence to the LTTE to carry out its activities, as it desired.

The LTTE exploited the anomalous situation to strengthen itself and brought in huge shipments of military hardware and supplies even as the peace process was losing steam, thanks to the internal schism of Sri Lanka politics. On the other hand, the armed forces were fuming in inaction, although the LTTE systematically culled military and civil intelligence operatives with impunity. The government of that time soft-pedalled the whole issue, perhaps in the belief that it could jeopardise the peace talks. It continued to restrain the SLAF from taking retaliatory action even as the tally of the LTTE's CFA violations mounted under the meticulous book keeping of the SLMM, which accounted for every one of them. The SLMM did nothing beyond periodically issuing statements asking both sides to observe the CFA norms. These were mostly addressed to the Government because they were less prickly about criticism. This `umpiring' attitude forms the basis of Norwegian mediation and perhaps it is required to encourage both sides to make progress in the talks. However, translated to monitoring, the same philosophy undermined the confidence of the Government in the SLMM. Large sections of the public, government, political parties and the media were also not happy with the way Norway was handling the mediation and monitoring processes.

The issue of Norwegian mediation and monitoring was a prominent issue in the 2005 presidential election. The SLFP Presidential aspirant, Mahinda Rajapakse, vowed to change them. On his election as President, Mr. Rajapakse managed to take away the responsibility of monitoring from Norway; and now a Swedish general heads the SLMM. It is clear the LTTE had been using the international objections to the resumption of Sri Lankan operations against it to its own advantage. Ever since Karuna broke away, the Tigers have been escalating the scale and level of violence bringing enormous pressure on President Rajapakse, to ensure that Karuna is removed from the scene. Thus for the Tamil people at large, LTTE actions have downgraded the quest for Tamil rights to govern themselves to the one point agenda of removing Karuna from a position of strength in the east.

In short, the LTTE's fight now stands reduced to a turf war to establish its rights over the northeast. Its continued escalation of violence means increased loss of international sympathy for Sri Lankan Tamils, particularly from major powers, so essential if their struggle for democratic rights is to succeed. The net result is a decisive shift of global attention from sympathy for the Tamil cause to curbing the LTTE and pressuring it to come to the table to discuss peace. It is going to be more difficult for the Tigers to do whatever they propose to do in the coming months.

Now that the President has announced his resolve to take strong retaliatory action with all the forces at his command, while continuing to maintain the ceasefire, the LTTE has painted itself into a corner. We can expect more clashes in the coming weeks and the population is going to face the fallout of such violence.

LTTE actions have given a lease of life to Sinhala hardliners. It has once again put Sri Lanka's Tamil population at risk; and those living in LTTE-controlled areas in even greater peril. Already the glare of publicity surrounding the LTTE actions has swept aside the incidents of human rights violations against Sri Lankan Tamils. Even if the patchwork ceasefire continues, the Tamils and their cause will continue to suffer.

The BBC quoted a peace monitor to the effect that the SLMM was monitoring war rather than peace. In any case, if this is called ceasefire, then what is war? The tragedy is it is a fight for LTTE turf and nothing more. It is a war of diminishing returns.

(Colonel R. Hariharan, a retired military intelligence specialist in counter-insurgency, served as head of intelligence with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka.
E-Mail: colhari@yahoo.com)
Source: The Hindu

 27 April 2006

Whither Sri Lanka's peace process?

V.S. Sambandan
Will the situation spiral out of control or will it ultimately veer back to the path of negotiations? The international community could help determine what happens.

SRI LANKA's faltering peace process suffered another blow on April 25 when a woman suicide bomber of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) blew herself up inside the Army headquarters in Colombo. She failed in her mission to kill the Commander of the Sri Lanka Army, Sarath Fonseka, but what she did was to alter the nature of the engagement between the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE.

The modus operandi adopted by the LTTE in its latest assassination bid - deploying a woman suicide bomber on a day marked for maternity care in the Army Hospital - shows the repulsive extent its war against the state has descended to. Two events of Tuesday mark a complete difference from the past four-odd years of a tenuous peace in Sri Lanka: the afternoon assassination attempt on Lt. Gen. Fonseka and the evening "deterrent strikes" by the Air Force and other wings of the armed forces.

Both carry clear signals from the Tigers and the Government. These need careful interpretation to even hazard a guess as to what is in store for South Asia's bloodiest internal conflict - whether the situation will spiral out of control or ultimately veer back to the path of negotiations. The "deterrent strikes" by the Sri Lanka Air Force, in the face of what the Government termed fresh LTTE attacks on the Sri Lanka Navy in the sensitive eastern Trincomalee district, mark a departure from the state's rules of engagement with the LTTE. So far the state was seen as "weak" in its responses to the LTTE's killings and "provocative attacks."

At stake in this new phase of engagement between the state and the rebels are issues that are both conceptual - the equation between the Government and a group that claims to be the "sole representative" of the Tamils and is bent on carving out a separate state - and humanitarian - where civilians and foot soldiers are often the first casualties in what is essentially a conflict that requires a political solution.

The LTTE's selection of the target for the latest suicide-bombing mission - the Army Commander - is central to its game plan. Not only is Lt. Gen. Fonseka the Army chief, he has battlefield experience in the northern theatre, has opposed the LTTE's demand for dismantling the northern High Security Zones even before he assumed office, and has worked on strengthening the Army since he took over in December 2005. To that extent, the assassination attempt is seen as both a `first strike' and a `pre-emptive one.'

The LTTE has been spoiling for a fight for long, trying to provoke the Government into a retaliation of sorts, which it could then play up at international fora to its advantage. This, while unilaterally suspending the Geneva negotiations to discuss the ceasefire agreement, points to a scenario in which the LTTE pushes the state over the brink, resorts to ground offensives, alters the demarcation lines between Government and rebel-held Sri Lanka, and then offers to negotiate. In short, the LTTE's game plan is to stay away from negotiations till it sees itself as being able to talk from a position of military strength. Its actions are largely unidirectional - towards fulfilling the agenda of separation through military means.

In the near term, the string of recent events - the LTTE's provocative strikes over the past couple of weeks, the attempted assassination of the Army chief, and the Sri Lankan Government's military response - is also to be seen against the backdrop of the Assembly elections in Tamil Nadu. By timing its pullout from the Geneva talks and then launching military offensives to synchronise with the democratic process in Tamil Nadu, the LTTE's unspoken agenda is to also propel the Sri Lankan Tamils issue into the Indian political discourse.

What requires more understanding is the Sri Lankan Government's military action after the assassination attempt on April 25. According to the Government, the Navy came under LTTE fire in the eastern Trincomalee district hours after the assassination attempt, and its air strikes, supported by the army and the navy, were to "deter" further rebel attacks. Herein is the containment agenda of any engagement between a state and a militarised opponent. The Sri Lankan Government spokesman has gone on record to state: "We have the right of self-defence to guard our security forces and our military camps."

There is also a key political outcome from these actions by the state. For long, hardliners in the south had been pushing for a military offensive against the LTTE. The air strikes have the potential impact of satisfying hardliners and sections of the security forces that feel enfeebled by continued LTTE attacks. Clearly, containment - of both the LTTE attacks and hardline southern rhetoric - is a key state objective directing the present phase of the unfolding military action.

One lesson from the engagements between successive governments in Colombo and the LTTE is that there is no military solution to the conflict. Hence, there is bound to be more pressure on both parties to resume talks and move towards a negotiated settlement.

The political deadlocks over the past decades can be divided into two phases. The pre-Chandrika Kumaratunga-Ranil Wickremesinghe period, in which Sri Lankan governments of the day saw the Tamil power-sharing demands as something that could not be met, and the Kumaratunga-decade when the LTTE, which had by then projected itself as the "sole representative," rejected the federalist packages.

It is on this issue that the Mahinda Rajapakse presidency will have to face its ultimate political test. Elected on a unitarist manifesto, President Rajapakse has now made it clear that he is for "maximum devolution."

A further elaboration of his political model for conflict resolution could significantly alter the internal dynamics that have been set off by the new terms of engagement between the state and the LTTE, and the international view of Sri Lankan affairs.

An unanswered question remains: How long will the current militarised mode continue? Much will depend on how effectively the state manages the military containment exercise and how fast it pushes forward a political solution - even if it is to be a unilateral offer.

For, the LTTE is most likely to strike at the state again. The assassination attempt on Lt. Gen. Fonseka is the clearest indication that rebels' theatre of operations has expanded from the North-East. It also foretells the possibility of a string of offensives aimed at stretching the state's military apparatus.

So far, decisive battles between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE have been in the northern theatre - Mullaittivu, Kilinochchi, and Elephant Pass. All of these are now under LTTE control. This time round, the LTTE has the disadvantage of being weakened in the East. Hence, the possibility of the LTTE changing the nature of its military operations, with more emphasis on non-conventional strikes, is not to be ruled out.

The global mood of zero-tolerance of terrorism and the international bans on the LTTE should make it evident that its project of beating the state into submission will have no takers. The present phase also offers the international community the opportunity to press for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The role of the international community to ensure that matters do not go out of hand gains more relevance now.

Now that the terms of military engagement between the Government and the Tigers have changed, the way out will largely be determined by the manner in which the political engagement is taken forward. For the international community, the key to this will be the manner in which the Government puts forward its solution for restructuring the Sri Lankan state from its present unitarist mould.

The major legacy of Ms. Kumaratunga's 11 years in office is that she had made unhesitant moves towards a federal Sri Lanka. By its successive acts, the LTTE pushed federalism out of the political parameters for a solution, making it more distant a political objective than it was a few years ago.

The past decades of bloodletting stem from two divergent positions - the state's entrenched unitarist position and the rebels' violent intransigence on separatism. The way out, hence, would be to halt the violence and return to the negotiating table to work out a solution that meets the aspirations of the minorities and allays the apprehensions of the majority.
Source: The Hindu

 27 April 2006

Outrageous attack

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam has once again shown that it is not interested in a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Sri Lanka. If anything, the LTTE suicide attack on the Sri Lankan Army commander is further evidence that it actually fears the prospect of such a settlement - fears for its own survival and future in a North-East Sri Lanka that has made its peace with the rest of the country. This is why it is reluctant to participate in peace talks and instead repeatedly attempts to provoke the Sri Lankan Government into a military response that will shatter the four-year-old truce. The LTTE hopes to then portray the Sri Lankan Government as a military machine that mercilessly crushes Tamil aspirations. Holed up in the Vanni, the LTTE leadership believes the international community will ignore its ruthless terrorist record, its recruitment of child soldiers, and its intolerance of dissent and democracy, and, above all, recognise it as a legitimate force fighting for Tamil rights. Winning legitimacy would help the LTTE cover considerable distance on the road to an independent Tamil Eelam where it wants to establish a self-serving rule over the Tamils. Thus does the LTTE hope to secure its future. This was the reasoning behind the LTTE assassination of Lakshman Kadirgamar in August 2005; behind all its attacks on the Sri Lankan military that have claimed the lives of more than a hundred soldiers and sailors since last November; and behind its attempt to foment anti-Tamil ethnic violence in Trincomalee earlier this month. With each incident, the LTTE's motives only stand exposed further.

As the response to the latest developments indicates, the world recognises the LTTE for what it is - a ruthless terrorist organisation. But the question has to be asked if the dozen or so countries, including the United States, that are directly or indirectly involved in the Norway-facilitated peace process are putting enough pressure on the LTTE to stay the peace course and negotiate a settlement. But for the Sri Lankan Government's exemplary restraint in the shadow war unleashed by the LTTE, the truce, which exists only on paper now, would have given way to full-scale hostilities months ago. President Mahinda Rajapakse cannot be blamed if his patience is now wearing a little thin. Following the latest provocation, he ordered air and naval strikes in North-East Sri Lanka. President Rajapakse evidently wanted to send a message that he will not remain a silent onlooker as a terrorist group tries to take out the country's army chief. Still, restraint is the Government's best weapon against the LTTE. The people of Sri Lanka - Tamil and Sinhalese - do not want a war, but this could well be the outcome if the tit-for-tat attacks continue. The Government's reiteration of its "complete adherence" to the ceasefire agreement gives some hope that war can yet be avoided. But whether the peace process can survive - and move forward - depends to a large extent on what moves the LTTE is planning next and if the international community can influence this in any positive way.
Source: The Hindu

 26 April 2006

Sri Lankan Army Chief injured in attack

V.S. Sambandan
Ten killed as woman suicide bomber blows herself up; Air Force launches deterrent sorties in the East

COLOMBO: The Commander of the Sri Lanka Army, Sarath Fonseka, survived an assassination attempt by a suspected woman suicide bomber of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) inside the Army Headquarters here on Tuesday afternoon.

At least 10 persons, including civilians, were killed and 26 others injured when the suicide bomber, disguised as a pregnant woman, blew herself up. .

Lt. Gen. Fonseka was rushed to the National Hospital here in a critical condition. After hours of surgery, shrapnel were removed and his condition is "stable," an Army spokesperson said in the night.

Hours after the attack, the situation was near-normal in Colombo, but it was tense in the rebel-controlled eastern Trincomalee district. According to reports from the east, fighter jets of the Air Force flew sorties over the rebel-held parts of the district in the evening. A senior Minister described the sorties as a "deterrent against further rebel attacks."

In an official statement, the Government said, "following the suicide bomb attack on the Army Commander, the LTTE positioned in the Sampur area launched an attack on the Navy in Trincomalee. The security forces have carried out an operation to deter further attacks by the LTTE."

"According to our Trincomalee MP, aerial bombardments were carried out over a rebel-controlled area. We do not have any information on casualties," said Suresh Premachandran, parliamentary coordinator of the LTTE-backed Tamil National Alliance.

An Army source said the bomber gained access into the tightly guarded Army Headquarters complex in the heart of Colombo "as today was a day marked for pregnant wives of soldiers."

"She was near the Army hospital when she jumped on the car in which the Army Commander was travelling, around 1.30 p.m. An alert motorcycle outrider, who noticed her suspicious movements, tried to push her away thereby minimising the damage to a certain extent," the source said.

The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission "strongly condemned" the attack as "yet another serious blow to the ceasefire agreement and the peace process." It "is likely to have very negative effects on the relationship between the Government and the LTTE and could jeopardise any possibility of future talks."

The Mission said the armed forces "have shown restraint and refrained from massive retaliation" in the face of "countless attacks in the last few weeks," and urged the Government to refrain from any retaliatory action now also and remain committed to the peace process.
Source: The Hindu

 18 April 2006

Situation in Sri Lanka not beyond redemption: Peiris

Immediate task is to "preserve stability of ceasefire"

CHENNAI: Despite the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam suspending participation in the Geneva talks with the Sri Lankan Government, "the situation, though bad, was not beyond redemption," G.L. Peiris, member of Parliament in the island nation, said on Monday.

Prof. Peiris, who headed the Government team of negotiators during President Chandrika Kumaratunga's tenure, said the redemption process called for a "deliberate attempt from all," who had a stake in peace in the country. The immediate task and "central preoccupation" should be to "preserve the stability of the ceasefire."

Window of opportunity

 5 April 2006

Teaching dissidence to LTTE

After four agonising years, the Sri Lankan peace process has boiled down to a single issue that has nothing to do with the rights of Tamils. It is the survival of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, which has centre-staged the bizarre demand that the Sri Lankan Government should guarantee its welfare by disarming Karuna, the breakaway LTTE leader. Immediately after the March 2004 rebellion, the LTTE declared it to be an "internal matter," which it would resolve on its own. Facilitator Norway, the ceasefire monitors, and the Sri Lankan Government all stood by, as the Vanni leadership launched a mini-war against the Karuna faction in eastern Sri Lanka. Unable to quell the revolt, V. Prabakaran's organisation has since changed tack - and made the "internal matter" the responsibility of the Government. This was the burden of the Tiger song at the Geneva talks in February, the first time the former combatants met after 2003. The issue could determine whether the next round of talks, scheduled for April 19, will be held at all. That Norway and the international ceasefire monitors parrot the LTTE's demand on this issue is deplorable. For a start, such a stance insinuates that the Sri Lankan Government maintains and supports the Karuna faction. The outgoing head of the ceasefire monitors, Hagrup Haukland, has conceded in a recent interview to a Sri Lankan newspaper that there is no evidence to back such an assumption. The ceasefire monitors need to be reminded that the `absence of evidence' is the ostensible reason for their reluctance to hold the LTTE responsible for outrageous ceasefire violations, notably the killings of political opponents as well as Sri Lankan soldiers and sailors.

When the ceasefire was signed in February 2002, the clause obliging the Government to disarm "paramilitaries" referred exclusively - and one-sidedly - to members of Tamil political parties opposed to the LTTE who carried weapons for their own protection against a killer organisation. The Government disarmed them by the stipulated deadline. The Karuna revolt was a later development, an outcome of the LTTE leadership's internal contradictions. The charge that the Government is in violation of the ceasefire by not disarming Karuna is completely over the top. In any case, why should the Government help a terrorist group set its house in order? The LTTE is determined to carve up Sri Lanka to form a separate Eelam; and there is no basis for its claim of being the `sole representative' of Sri Lankan Tamils. Karuna's existence and flourishing mock the LTTE case for dividing the country. It helps, however inadequately, the case of thousands of Sri Lankan Tamils who do not accept either the LTTE's secessionist programme and murderous ways or its hegemonic claim. There is no reason for the Sri Lankan Government to be apologetic about Karuna. It is time the LTTE learnt that dissidence is an integral and inescapable part of democratic politics.
Source: The Hindu

 3 April 2006

Sri Lanka and Pakistan agree to combat terrorism

B. Muralidhar Reddy
Mahinda Rajapakse in Islamabad Pakistan reaffirmed its support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Sri Lanka

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan and Sri Lanka have expressed their resolve to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations for the preservation of shared values and principles and in the interest of peace and progress of their societies.

A joint statement issued here on Saturday on the occasion of the three-day visit of Sri Lankan President, Mahinda Rajapakse, said in the course of the interaction between the two sides the leaders agreed that combating terrorism is the great challenge of our times. "Both Pakistan and Sri Lanka have been victims of terrorism," the statement said.

Much to the surprise of observers here, Pakistan Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz received the visiting dignitary at the military airport in Chaklala on Friday. On Sunday, the Sri Lankan President would be addressing a forum of Pakistan and Sri Lankan business leaders in Karachi.

The visit of Mr. Rajapakse is considered of high symbolic value though in substantive terms only three minor pacts were signed on the occasion. His wife, seven Ministers and two Deputy Ministers accompanied him.

During his stay here, Mr. Rajapakse called on Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf and held official talks at the Presidential Palace. He also met the Prime Minister.

The statement said the two sides exchanged views on a range of bilateral, regional and international issues and reaffirmed their commitment to promotion of peace, stability, economic development and social progress and agreed to intensify cooperation and consultations on bilateral, regional and global issues by maintaining regular high level contacts.

"Pakistan reaffirmed its support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Sri Lanka and for the ongoing peace process in the country. The two sides agreed to make every effort to further strengthen their multifaceted and multi-sector cooperation in education, culture, commerce & trade, science & technology, defence and tourism for the common benefit of the two countries, based on the tradition of friendly relations which has always existed between them," it said.

The Pakistan side briefed Mr. Rajapakse about the ongoing Composite Dialogue with India aimed at resolving all outstanding issues. The Sri Lankan President shared his assessment of the ongoing peace process in Sri Lanka.

Pakistan and Sri Lanka have already concluded a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that covers Trade in Goods as well as Trade in Services.

SAFTA ratification

 10 March 2006

Rhetoric clouds peace process in Sri Lanka

V.S. Sambandan
Negotiations to resolve the ethnic conflict have again run into trouble with both the Sinhala and Tamil camps taking increasingly confrontationist positions.

DEBILITATING RHETORIC has been the bane of peace processes in Sri Lanka. Close on the heels of last month's Geneva talks between the Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, an already fluid situation has been further complicated by a rash of statements. This has raised doubts over the continuation of the negotiations. Broadly, the current rhetoric has three strands - all emanating from post-Geneva developments, after the Government and the Tigers committed themselves to "respect and uphold" a tottering ceasefire agreement. They also reflect entrenched positions of hardliners at the two ends of Sri Lanka's political spectrum: those of the Sinhala majoritarian-unitarists and the Tamil separatists.

The ink on the Geneva statement of February 23 had hardly dried when the first salvo was fired by a member of the Government's negotiating team, H.L. de Silva - a leading lawyer widely known in Sri Lanka from his characterisation of "federalism" as "a beguiling serpent." The Geneva statement, he contended, reflected an "amendment" in the ceasefire agreement. The LTTE disagreed. Its chief negotiator, Anton S. Balasingham, dismissed the interpretation as "ridiculous" and one that was aimed at "appeasing Sinhala hardliners."

Following up on the "amendment" controversy, the unitarist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the majoritarian Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) turned the heat on when they publicly distanced themselves from the Geneva statement. The JHU said it was not happy with the explanation that the ceasefire agreement was "amended" and wanted specific changes to the document. The JVP, for its part, said it welcomed the Geneva talks and the Government's position at the inaugural - that the ceasefire agreement was unconstitutional. The sting, however, was in the tail with the JVP taking the view that the Government in committing itself to "respect and uphold" the ceasefire agreement was contradicting its own stated position.

The second bone of contention was raised by the JVP when it wanted the facilitator, Norway, to be sent packing as it had "compromised Sri Lanka's sovereignty." Almost simultaneously the LTTE declared it had "no faith" in the Geneva talks.

The rhetoric can be viewed from two perspectives. Behind the cacophony of voices lie some critical issues that are central to the peace process. Viewed from one perspective the upsurge of rhetoric is also a manifestation of deeper concerns that are the political raison d'etre of the parties that raise them.

From the Government's perspective, the "amendment" argument was seen as a way of balancing out its own set of contradictions. One of the long-held positions of the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party was that the ceasefire agreement was a "violation of the constitution" and that its "lop-sided" nature favoured the LTTE. In addition, President Mahinda Rajapakse's electoral allies, the JVP and the JHU want a review of the agreement. Thus the Government's Geneva commitment to "respect and uphold" the document raises political issues. It is against that backdrop that the "amendment" argument was put forward. However, this failed to serve its intended purpose with the JHU declaring that post-Geneva statement could not be construed as an amendment.

The JVP, which sees itself as a ruling party in waiting, has even deeper political and electoral concerns. In its own way, the current ruling coalition is also one in which there is a jostling for space between two left-of-centre parties - the SLFP and the JVP. If the latter is to hold its base and further expand its electoral gains in a prospective poll, it needs a rallying point. This rallying point, now, is the conflict resolution process. While there is a broad agreement on the need to avoid a full-blown military offensive, different perspectives on the approach to conflict resolution could well provide room for political machinations.

The current rhetoric is also to be viewed against the island-wide election to local bodies scheduled for March 30. A critical aspect will be how the JVP and the SLFP define their space within the ruling coalition.

A repetition

 25 February 2006

Peace holds in Sri Lanka, for the time being

V.S. Sambandan
The Geneva talks represent a small, hesitant step away from a relapse into war. It is critical for Colombo and the LTTE to remain engaged.

"POLITICS," CHAIRMAN Mao famously said in 1938, "is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed." Sri Lanka's latest politics of war and peace was set in an Alpine chateau in Switzerland, where the Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ended yet another round of direct talks on Thursday.

The Geneva talks, which coincided with the fourth anniversary of the ceasefire agreement (CFA), were more about politics than the immediate prospects of conflict resolution. The main outcome - the two sides will meet again in Geneva in April - is that the prospect of the island relapsing into war has seemingly waned, momentarily. In effect, it represents the continuation of the holding operation.

Norwegian facilitator Erik Solheim's declaration announced no major breakthrough. None was expected either. The commitments fall under two categories: those jointly made by the Government and the LTTE and those specific to each party. By themselves, the commitments do not foretell a big change in the near-term. It is in the minutiae of the CFA that there are clauses of concern in the medium and long terms that could determine the nature of post-conflict northeastern Sri Lanka.

The joint commitments include "respecting and upholding the ceasefire agreement" and taking "all necessary measures to ensure that there will be no intimidation, acts of violence, abductions or killings."

The LTTE has committed itself to taking "all necessary measures to ensure that there will be no acts of violence against the security forces and police." Colombo will "take all necessary measures in accordance with the CFA to ensure that no armed group or person other than [the] government security forces will carry arms or conduct armed operations." To a large extent, these outcomes conformed to the expectation in the run-up to the two-day talks.

Implementation the key